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The policy of maintaining tight control of domestic energy prices has characterized the political 
and economic environment in most Arab countries, together with many other parts of the world, 
for decades. The objectives behind such a policy range from overall welfare objectives such as 
expanding energy access and protecting poor households’ incomes; to economic development 
objectives such as fostering industrial growth and smoothing domestic consumption; and to politi-
cal considerations, including the distribution of oil and natural gas rents in resource-rich countries. 
While energy subsidies may be seen as achieving some of a country’s objectives, this paper argues 
they are a costly and inefficient way of doing so. Energy subsidies distort price signals, with 
serious implications on efficiency and the optimal allocation of resources. Energy subsidies also 
tend to be regressive, with high-income households and industries benefiting proportionately most 
from low energy prices. However, despite such adverse effects, energy subsidies constitute an 
important social safety net for the poor in many parts of the Arab world, and any attempts to 
reduce or eliminate them in the absence of compensatory programmes would lead to a decline in 
households’ welfare and erode the competitiveness of certain industries. Therefore, a critical factor 
for successful reforms will be the ability of governments to compensate their populations for the 
reduction or removal of subsidies through carefully designed mitigation measures that protect the 
poorest and assist the economy in its long-term adaptation. We argue that a reform of energy pric-
ing mechanisms in the Arab world may be seen as beneficial from more than one perspective, and 
as offering potential paths for reform. Nevertheless, this paper recognizes that the current political 
climate in the region will render the reform of domestic energy prices difficult in practice, such 
that reform may indeed be a medium- to long-term endeavour.
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1.  Introduction
The essential role played in economic and social development by the various types of primary 
fuel and electricity provides many governments with several arguments in favour of subsidiz-
ing energy prices and maintaining a tight control of the domestic energy sector. Low energy 
prices, particularly for electricity and higher quality fuels such as petroleum products, help the 
lowest income groups gain access to modern forms of energy. Furthermore, they help governments 
protect the incomes of citizens, especially those in the lowest parts of the income distribution, 
thus contributing to poverty alleviation. Maintaining control of energy prices could also help 
offset commodity price fluctuations and smooth consumption against wide price fluctuations in 
international markets. In many resource-rich countries, low energy prices are used as a tool to 
distribute state benefits to the population without the need for extensive administrative capabilities 
and income testing. They are also used to promote industrialization and economic diversification 
aimed at generating employment opportunities and enhancing an economy’s global competitive-
ness. Finally, controlling energy prices is often considered as an important tool for macroeconomic 
management, especially in the control of inflation.
The Arab world is no exception when it comes to controlling energy prices.1 Governments’ use of 
explicit and implicit subsidies on the region’s most commonly used forms of energy – crude oil, 
oil products, natural gas, and electricity – have characterized the domestic energy pricing environ-
ment in most Arab countries for decades. The region itself, however, is defined by a remarkable 
degree of political and economic diversity, reflected in the variety of different types of economies 
– ranging from some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon exporters such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
to energy importing countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. This range of different 
political and economic contexts renders the Arab world a region rich in experience, which is worth 
studying with regard to the effects of energy pricing policies. Despite the challenge this diversity 
necessarily creates to any research in the field, this paper conveys three main messages that apply 
to the social and economic implications of low energy prices throughout the Arab world.
Message 1: Energy subsidies are costly to the Arab world in social, economic, 
and environmental terms
One main message is that despite constituting an important social safety net for the poor and 
achieving some economic goals such as promoting industrialization, subsidization of energy has 
many unintended adverse consequences for the Arab world. This suggests that the economic costs 
1 The Arab countries studied in this paper include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
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of such subsidies in many cases outweigh their perceived benefits. These costs arise in three 
main areas: 
1. Economic cost. Energy subsidies lead to a number of economic inefficiencies that are 
experienced widely throughout the Arab world. They result in misallocation of resources 
preventing the country from optimizing the use of its reserves; they incentivize over-usage 
of energy, leading to exceptionally high consumption growth rates for energy in many parts 
of the Arab world; they lower incentives for productivity improvements and investments in 
more energy-efficient technology; they distort pricing signals to customers, leading to energy 
waste, unwanted inter-fuel substitution effects, and a lack of incentives for investment in 
alternative energies; and they often result in a disparity between domestic petroleum prices in 
neighbouring countries, encouraging the smuggling of petroleum products and exacerbating 
the problem of fuel shortage in many parts of the Arab world.
2. Social cost. Of particular significance for the Arab world are the consequences of energy 
subsidies on social equity and on the critical issue of poverty reduction. Human poverty is 
still widely spread throughout the Arab world, particularly in parts of the Levant and North 
Africa. Poverty rates range from 11 per cent in Jordan to 30 per cent in Morocco, 40 per cent 
in Egypt, and close to 60 per cent in Yemen. Severe implications include insufficient access 
to food and healthy nutrition, education and basic health services, and also to lack of energy 
access itself.2 While energy subsidies constitute an important social safety net for the poor, 
they are regressive in nature because in many instances richer households tend to capture 
the bulk of subsidies, skewing the existing income distribution. Furthermore, in many cases, 
fuel subsidies can remove substantial resources from ‘pro-poor’ sectors such as health and 
education, and from social and infrastructure projects that are more beneficial to households 
in low-income brackets.
3. Environmental cost. Energy subsidies also contribute negatively towards the protection of 
the environment, an issue of particular importance for the climate-sensitive agricultural 
producers of the Levant and North Africa. Subsidies can lead to higher energy use or reduce 
the incentive to conserve energy, with potential adverse environmental consequences such 
as increasing airborne emissions and greenhouse gases. Fuel subsidies can also hinder the 
development of renewable and clean energy technologies – such as solar and wind – which 
find it difficult to compete with subsidized fossil fuels. 
Message 2: There is growing fiscal pressure for reform
The limited success of several Arab countries in revising their energy pricing policies over the 
past decade has demonstrated the practical difficulties of implementing energy pricing reform. 
Price increases, particularly when large and unaccompanied by compensatory measures such as 
direct cash transfers or improved social safety nets, can rally large-scale popular opposition to 
2 UNDP (2009, 132–3).
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governments. At no time has this popular force been so apparent in the Arab world as during 2011, 
a year in which popular protests and uprisings removed the long-serving presidents of Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya from their posts, in consequence of their peoples’ longstanding political and 
economic grievances. In the coming years, therefore, Arab governments willing to engage in 
energy pricing reforms will be confronted with increasing pressure to strike a delicate balance 
between necessary but painful economic reform, and the political and economic expectations of 
their young populations.
However, the mounting fiscal cost of maintaining their current subsidy systems, felt particularly 
during the past decade, also confronts many Arab governments. Global oil price rises during the 
2000s substantially increased the import bill for Arab oil importing countries, and thus the cost of 
fuel price subsidies, vis-à-vis ten years previously. The import of natural gas, the only alternative 
to petroleum products used by most Arab states, has likewise become more expensive, as has the 
production of domestic reserves of natural gas. The enormous fiscal burden caused by energy 
subsidies, encountered today by many energy importing countries in the Arab world, implies that 
the reform of domestic energy prices has increasingly become a necessity rather than a choice. 
For the region’s hydrocarbon exporting countries, the substantial opportunity cost of consuming 
crude oil, refined products, and natural gas domestically at a fraction of international prices, has 
similarly led to calls for a more efficient use of depletable natural resources. 
Message 3: The reform of subsidies will entail serious effects on the poor and 
must hence be accompanied by focused mitigation measures
The reduction or elimination of domestic subsidies will entail serious economic consequences, 
particularly for households. The sharp rises in energy prices associated with pricing reform have 
adverse direct and indirect effects on households’ income, with poorer households often suffering 
a larger decline in incomes. Therefore, a critical success factor for these reforms, as seen from 
previous examples of countries which have reformed their energy prices, will be the ability of 
governments to compensate their populations for the reduction or removal of subsidies – through 
well-targeted energy subsidies towards low income groups, the distribution of direct cash trans-
fers, and/or improving and expanding their existing social safety nets. There are also other options 
which governments can use to reform their energy pricing frameworks using either fast- or slow-
track reforms that eliminate energy subsidies over time. A pivotal factor determining the pace and 
extent of potential steps towards reform will be both the fiscal and the administrative capabilities 
of the governments making such reforms. The diversity of the Arab world in this regards suggests 
that no single reform agenda will fit all countries in the region equally.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the use, consequences, and costs of energy 
subsidies in the Arab world; and to offer options for the reform of energy pricing schemes that 
address the economic, social, and political concerns associated with steps towards such reform. 
The paper’s primary focus thus rests on the impact of energy subsidy reform on poverty levels, 
for which reason particular emphasis is placed on the experience of the Levant and North Africa. 
The paper is divided into four main sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the size of energy 
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subsidies and current ways of financing them in the Arab world; it attempts to show different 
ways of financing subsidies in the context of energy producing and energy importing countries, 
including via explicit and implicit subsidies. Section 3 evaluates the effects of energy subsidies on 
the region’s economies, by assessing their overall benefit in the region against their various social, 
economic, and environmental costs. A general analysis of the Arab world is given, followed by a 
case study of Egypt. Section 4 proposes ways of reforming energy subsidies in the Arab world, and 
briefly discusses recent regional experience with fuel subsidy reform in the case of Jordan. Section 
5 offers some conclusions. 
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2.  Energy Subsidies: A Basic Overview
This section provides an overview of the use of energy subsidies in the Arab world. It begins 
by offering a basic definition of subsidies, including a brief review of differences in definitions 
between different international organizations. Second, it discusses the rationale behind subsidiz-
ing energy from governments’ perspective, including important objectives such as poverty allevia-
tion and macroeconomic stability. Third, it looks at different ways of financing subsidies. Fourth, 
it summarizes the various fuel price adjustment mechanisms used in the Arab world. Finally it 
discusses energy subsidies in terms of their prevalence within the Arab world. 
2.1. Defining Subsidies
The concept of subsidy is often described as ‘too elusive’ to define.3 This is reflected in the vari-
ous definitions used in the literature. At the very general level, a subsidy can be defined as ‘any 
government assistance, in cash or in kind, to private sector producers or consumers for which 
the government receives no equivalent compensation in return, but conditions the assistance on a 
particular performance by the recipient’.4 It is clear from this definition that many governments’ 
actions can be categorized as involving assistance, including cash subsidies, credit subsidies, tax 
subsidies, procurement subsidies, and in-kind subsidies.
De Moor and Calamai provide a more narrow definition of subsidy as ‘any measure that keeps 
prices for consumers below the market level or keeps prices for producers above the market 
level or that reduces costs for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support’.5 
This definition underlies the price-gap approach, which remains the most commonly used method 
for calculating subsidies due to its simplicity. The price-gap approach compares the observed 
price for a good or a service against a certain benchmark or reference price. A joint report by 
IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank for the 2010 G-20 Summit in Toronto notes the existence of a 
major disagreement among international organizations concerning the choice of the reference 
price, and consequently ‘a commonly agreed definition of subsidies has proven a major challenge 
in the G-20 context and countries have decided to adopt their own definition of energy subsidies’.6 
Specifically, international organizations such as the IEA and the World Bank estimate the size of 
the subsidy based on the differential between prices of fuels in international markets, and the price 
at which these fuels are sold domestically. On the other hand, ‘OPEC is of the opinion that the 
3 Clements et al. (1995)
4 US Congress Joint Economic Committee, 1972; cited in Clements et al. (1995, 1-2).
5 De Moor and Calamari (1977, 1).
6 IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank (2010, 8).
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benchmark price to be used in the case of energy resource well-endowed countries should be the 
cost of production’.7 Some consider that measures based on production cost are consistent with the 
definition used by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, the following conditions must be satisfied for a subsidy to exist: ‘(i) a 
financial contribution (ii) by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member 
(iii) which confers a benefit’.8 Based on this definition, some analysts argue that as long as the price 
charged to consumers is not below production costs, then it is difficult ‘to justify that a benefit had 
been conferred to domestic producers’.9  
In standard economic theory, the most appropriate benchmark with which to compare domestic 
prices is the marginal cost which refers to the increment in total cost that results from a unit 
change in output. Economic analysis emphasizes the merits of pricing policies that allow prices to 
reflect the economic cost of providing a good or service, as these maximize economic efficiency 
and result in the optimal allocation of resources. Measures of marginal cost, however, are difficult 
to observe in practice. Thus, the focus is instead on the concept of opportunity cost. The opportu-
nity cost is not related to production costs; instead, it measures the forgone value of the resource 
when that resource is not utilized in its best alternative use, e.g. its value in international markets in 
the case of internationally traded goods. For commodities such as crude oil and refined petroleum 
products which are traded and where it is possible to identify an international benchmark, it is often 
assumed that oil/petroleum products prices in international markets are good approximations of 
the opportunity cost.10 For natural gas, the issues are more complex, especially in the context of 
energy exporting countries. First, unlike crude oil, there is no reliable international benchmark for 
gas prices. Second, in some exporting countries, much of the gas produced is in association with 
crude oil and Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs). Given that crude oil is the most sought-after item, until 
recently many governments treated natural gas as a (free) by-product. Consequently, one could 
argue that the cost allocated to gas production should be set to zero, or at most to the cost involved 
in the construction and operation of the infrastructure needed to capture, treat, and distribute the 
associated gas. Issues such as the production of joint products (but also the availability of spare 
capacity in some oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE)11 and their 
implications on measuring subsidies have been recognized by the recent IEA/OPEC/OECD/World 
Bank joint report, which notes that ‘the price-gap method has limitations which apply particularly 
in the case of countries with large endowments of energy resources’.12  
Keeping these caveats in mind, this paper uses the IEA’s most recent estimates for energy sub-
sidies, based on a price-gap approach that compares domestic prices to international shadow 
7 Ibid.
8 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’), WTO Website, downloaded 
from: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm.
9 Dargin, J (2010).
10 Coady et al. (2006).
11 Fattouh (2011).
12 Koplow outlines some other limitations of the price-gap approach, including the fact that global prices themselves 
may be affected by subsidies or other distortions; adjustments to border prices can be challenging; and use of net-
of-tax values for internal prices may not always be appropriate. See Koplow (2009).
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prices.13 Given that this paper’s main focus is on internationally traded fuels, comparing domestic 
prices with those in international markets is the most obvious choice. For completeness, however, 
the authors also use official government statistics for the case studies of Egypt and Jordan. It is 
important to note that official calculations may differ substantially from measures used by the 
IEA, World Bank or the IMF due to differences in the underlying methodology. The government 
of Egypt, for instance, calculates its subsidy based on the losses incurred by national oil and gas 
companies when selling petroleum products below their cost (i.e. the financial cost only).14 
2.2. The Rationale for Energy Subsidies
Domestic energy pricing policies can serve multiple objectives which may often stand in conflict 
with each other, making it very difficult to evaluate the overall effectiveness of subsidy programmes. 
These objectives include the extension of social welfare, fostering economic development, as well 
as political considerations. In this section, the authors of this paper focus on the most common 
objectives behind the introduction of energy subsidies in the Arab world.
Expanding Access to Energy
Expanding energy access has been one of the key objectives for governments around the world 
when subsidizing various types of energy. Energy poverty, defined as the lack of household access 
to electricity or modern forms of fuel for cooking and heating, remains a key challenge in many 
parts of the developing world, including the Arab world.15 According to the UNEP, an estimated 
1.6 billion people have no access to electricity, while more than two billion people are still reliant 
on traditional fuels such as wood and charcoal for cooking and heating.16  In the Arab world, fig-
ures from 2002 suggest that some 65 million people in the Arab world had no access to electricity, 
and an additional 60 million were severely undersupplied, both in urban and rural areas. While 
the region can reflect on some important achievements in terms of electrification rates, these rates 
vary considerably – between 100 per cent in some countries such as Kuwait, to 7.7 per cent in 
Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Somalia. In terms of cooking and heating, almost a fifth of the 
Arab population relies on non-commercial fuels like wood, dung, and agricultural residues, par-
ticularly in Comoros, Djibouti, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia but also in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
and Syria.17
It is widely recognized that the lack of access to modern forms of energy, such as petroleum 
products and electricity, inhibits economic and social development and increases poverty. Thus, 
13 A full account of the IEA’s calculation methodology of energy subsidies can be found on its website at www.iea.
org/weo/methodology_sub.asp. 
 IEA data is not immune to shortcomings; most immediately, one concern by the authors is the absence of data 
for particular types of fuel. Where the IEA lacks official data for fuel types, their rate of subsidisation equals zero 
despite sizeable subsidies that would technically fall under the definition of subsidies used by the IEA.
14 These issues will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
15 For the case of Yemen, see El-Katiri and Fattouh (2011).
16 UNEP (2008).
17 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)/ League of Arab States (2005).
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transitioning to clean and modern fuels constitutes a key objective for many developing countries. 
Furthermore, improved access to energy services has become one of the underlying conditions for 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since household income levels are seen as 
one main determinant of energy access,18 energy subsidies are often expected to facilitate energy 
access, both to basic fuels such as kerosene – widely deemed to be the fuel of the poor – as well 
as to higher quality fuels such as LPG, and electricity, by reducing the cost of the fuel. Subsidies 
may also be used to help the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as electricity grids into 
rural areas, through direct producer subsidies that incentivize investment in new infrastructure, 
or through consumer subsidies that decrease the costs of initial household connections to grids. 
Protecting the Poor
Protecting households with low incomes from high fuel costs is considered to be one of the key 
factors behind subsidies.19 This objective can be pursued in a variety of ways: governments may 
target those fuels, most typically kerosene, that are widely used directly by the poor; alterna-
tively, governments could try to target the poor indirectly, for instance by diesel subsidies – diesel 
being widely used in the public transport sector considered as the main mode of transport for 
low income households, and diesel is also widely used by farmers in rural areas. Other countries 
provide subsidies to producers, on the ground that subsidies reduce production costs and these 
producers will then pass these lower costs on to end users by offering cheaper consumer goods. 
Rather than targeting the poor directly, some governments tend to keep all petroleum products 
below international prices, regardless of whether these fuels are used by the poor or the rich. 
Fostering Industrial Development
Subsidized petroleum products can also be provided to producers such as power stations, manu-
facturers, energy-intensive industries, financial institutions, and other commercial firms. Energy-
intensive industries – such as cement, fertilizers, and petrochemicals – are likely to benefit the most 
from such subsidies, as energy constitutes an important component of their intermediate cost. The 
rationale behind such subsidies is to induce firms to provide their goods and services to consumers 
at affordable prices; to help protect local industries against foreign competition; to enhance their 
export competitiveness; and to protect local employment. From a broader perspective, subsidizing 
the industrial sector can, by promoting and protecting a national advantage, be part of a country’s 
industrial and economic development planning. This factor is of particular importance to the Arab 
world’s oil and gas producers, who often use their domestic energy resources to develop more 
diversified, value-added industries such as fertilizer and petrochemicals production centres.
Consumption Smoothing
Governments can also offset temporary commodity price fluctuations by controlling energy prices, 
and there are good reasons for doing so: consumers and producers may incur costs in adjusting 
their consumption and production in the face of volatile energy prices. Smoothing the effects 
18 e.g. Gupta and Sudarshan (2009)
19 Alderman (2002).
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on consumption can economize on these adjustment costs.20 For example, it may be possible for 
households and the private sector to smooth such a budgetary shock by resorting to capital markets 
or by taking self insurance through increasing precautionary savings, which can be drawn on 
when energy prices are high and paid into when energy prices are low. Alternatively, the private 
sector can engage in hedging activity. However, these tools for consumption smoothing may not 
be available to households or the private sector. For instance, consumers and producers may not 
have access to credit markets. Furthermore, although the market for energy commodities deriva-
tives is well developed, the private sector in developing countries usually does not have access to 
such instruments.21 Given these market failures, there may be an argument in favour of a role for 
government intervention.22 Subsidizing domestic prices when prices in international markets are 
high, and increasing taxes when prices in international markets are low, can smooth consumption 
in the face of highly volatile energy prices. 
Avoiding Inflationary Pressures
One of the main worries facing many governments in the Arab world is that international increases 
in prices of key commodities such as energy and food induce inflationary pressures. Energy is an 
important component of the consumer basket, and any increase in the price of energy is auto-
matically reflected in an increase in the consumer price index (CPI). It is also argued that high 
fuel prices cause an upward shift in the cost structure of industries, which is then passed on to 
consumers.23 If nominal wages respond to increases in living costs, then higher energy prices can 
stimulate inflationary expectations and second round inflationary effects, which can pose serious 
concerns, especially if the government already faces inflationary pressures. 
Political Considerations    
Fuel subsidies are often very popular and they can therefore be introduced or increased, as appro-
priate, to alleviate popular discontent. Among the large Arab oil and gas producers in particular, the 
policy of supplying low-priced energy to the domestic market can also be a measure of distributing 
oil and gas rents. For example, many Arab Gulf exporters have engaged in providing their citizens 
with plentiful supplies of cheap energy for decades, as a cornerstone of their citizens’ participa-
tion in the natural resource wealth of their country. Contingent on the comparative advantage in 
production costs of energy resources in these countries, many citizens in oil and gas producing 
countries consider low-priced energy as a guaranteed birthright.
Energy subsidies are often entrenched in institutional barriers and lock-in mechanisms, which 
makes it difficult to abolish them. This is because subsidies, by definition, entail creation of rents 
for certain industries, regions, or group of people. Since these rents accrue disproportionately to 
certain groups (industrialists or particular classes of consumers) while the costs are widely spread, 
20 Federico et al. (2001).
21 It is important to stress that the obstacles that prevent the private sector from engaging in these activities also ap-
ply to many governments in developing countries.
22 Federico et al. (2001).
23 Hope and Singh (1995).
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the prime beneficiaries of the rents will always have an interest in defending the continuation of 
the programmes, because the benefits exceed the costs to them. These groups will also have the 
greatest incentive and capability to organize effective political action, leading to what is known 
as political mobilization bias, where the government would respond to the interests of small but 
homogenous groups rather than to some vague wide general interest.24
2.3. Financing Energy Subsidies in the Arab World
The financing energy of subsidies takes different forms, depending on a wide range of factors 
such as whether the country is a net exporter or a net importer of the petroleum product; the 
organization of the energy sector; the ownership structure of energy assets; the distribution 
network of gas and petroleum products; and the health of government finances. In this paper, 
an important distinction is made between net energy importing countries on the one hand, and 
net energy exporters on the other (see Table 1). Arab energy net exporters include high income 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE; but also mid- and lower income economies 
such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Yemen, which face substantial poverty levels, but which have 
different options relating to the pricing of domestically consumed energy than those confronting 
net-importers (see discussion below). It should also be noted that very few energy exporters are 
net exporters across the board. Egypt and Yemen, for instance, are net importers of crude oil 
(Egypt) and refined products (Yemen), while several of the Gulf states, notably the UAE and 
Kuwait, are net importers of natural gas. The table below also ignores traded electricity, on which 
several Arab economies increasingly rely.25 It is hence possible to find different ways of financing 
subsidies in one and the same country, including the parallel use of explicit and implicit subsidies 
in countries both exporting and importing different types of energy. 
24 UNEP/IEA (2001).
25 Consistent numbers for trade in electricity are unavailable for a number of Arab countries; Net importers are 
Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan; Levantine imports of Egyptian electricity rose sharply in 2011 due to shut-
downs in gas-fired power plants in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon following interruptions in Egyptian pipeline gas 
supplies earlier in the year. The GCC countries, with the exception of Oman, started exchanging small amounts 
of spinning reserve through the GCC Interconnection Grid, launched in 2009. None of these exchanges has been 
operating on commercial trading terms. See Darbouche and Fattouh (2011); El-Katiri, L. (2011); Gulf Oil & 
Gas (2011).
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tABlE 1: ARAB EnERgy ImpORtERS AnD pRODuCERS AnD tHEIR nEt EnERgy BAlAnCES,  
2009 AnD 2010
Country
Oil 
production 
(1000 b/d), 
2010
Oil 
Consumption 
(1000 b/d), 
2010
net Oil  
Balance 
(1000 b/d), 
2010
natural 
gas 
production 
(Bcm), 
2009
natural gas 
Consumption 
(Bcm), 2009
net natural 
gas Balance 
(Bcm), 2009
net energy 
importing 
Countries
Jordan 0.09 98 –97.91 0.25 3.1 –2.85
lebanon 0 106 –106.00 0 0.04 –0.04
morocco 3.94 209 –205.06 0.06 0.56 –0.50
tunisia 83.72 84 –0.28 3.6 4.85 –1.25
West bank 0 24 –24.00 0 0 0
Small 
energy 
exporting 
Countries*
bahrain 46.43 47 –0.57 12.58 12.58 0
egypt 662.62 740 –77.38 62.69 44.37 18.32
oman 867.88 142 725.88 24.77 14.72 10.04
Syria 401 292 109 6.19 7.1 –0.91
yemen 258.75 157 101.75 0.52 0.1 0.42
large 
energy 
exporting 
Countries
Algeria 2077.74 312 1765.74 81.43 28.76 52.67
iraq 2408.47 694 1714.47 1.15 1.15 0
Kuwait 2450.37 354 2096.37 11.19 12.08 –0.89
libya 1789.16 289 1500.16 15.9 6.01 9.89
Qatar 1437.22 166 1271.22 89.29 21.1 68.19
Saudi 
Arabia 10521.09 2643 7878.09 78.45 78.45 0
uAe26 2812.84 545 2267.84 59.06 59.06 0
Source: Authors; EIA; Cedigaz
* less than 1 million b/d of oil equivalent
Financing Energy Subsidies in Energy Importing Countries
Energy importers face the standard range of options for financing subsidies. Energy subsidies can 
be on-budget or off-budget. On-budget subsidies constitute explicit cash transfers made by the 
government to either the producer or the consumer receiving the subsidy, registered on the state’s 
budget (these are also referred to as explicit subsidies). For instance, a government may mandate 
that a public utility sets the selling price below the cost of production. The government then 
finances the public utility’s losses by transferring funds from the budget.27 For net energy import-
ers, these funds can be secured by cutting government expenditure in other areas, increasing 
direct or indirect taxes, and/or by borrowing in local or international markets. Alternatively, a net 
importer may decide to finance the subsidy programme through off-budget activities. Off-budget 
subsidies are less transparent and more difficult to calculate. In terms of public finances, their 
26 The UAE became a net importer of natural gas in 2008; Owing to some gas exports having been under long-term 
contracts, the data presented in this table does not reflect this gap.
27 In many countries’ budget records, this concept underlies their measure of subsidies in the economy, e.g. in the 
case of Egypt.
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impact is similar to on-budget subsidies: off-budget subsidies will have to be paid for, and thus 
will eventually be translated into, higher government deficits which need to be financed. Thus, 
financing off-budget subsidies is considered as a quasi-fiscal activity which eventually creates 
a quasi-fiscal deficit. A common feature of all types of energy subsidies in energy importing 
countries is that their size is typically beyond governmental control. 
Energy subsidies can also be cross financed between different energy user groups. Cross subsidies 
occur when tariffs below the cost of production are charged, for instance, to household users, and 
the revenue shortfall is offset by increasing industrial/commercial sector tariffs to above-cost 
levels. Other types of cross subsidies are found in uniform national pricing systems, when a single 
tariff structure is applied to consumers whatever their location (urban, rural, etc.) or when utility 
companies raise tariffs to recover lost revenues from non-paying customers.
Financing Energy Subsidies in Energy Exporting Countries
The government of an energy exporting country is faced with different choices. The standard 
argument used by producers of crude oil and natural gas is that their energy resource wealth 
and the low cost of domestic production justify low domestic energy prices to a certain extent. 
Low-cost energy enjoyed by consumers in the Arab world’s hydrocarbon producing countries 
is hence often not considered by these countries as subsidized energy, owing to the fact that no 
explicit government transfer is made. For instance, the national oil company can be mandated to 
sell petroleum products for the domestic market at below international prices but above produc-
tion costs. In this case, the national oil company does not incur financial losses, and hence the 
government does not need to make an explicit transfer to compensate the national oil company for 
losses. Nevertheless, low pricing of fuels involves an implicit subsidy or an implicit transfer. The 
implicit subsidy represents the economic rent/revenue wasted by failing to sell oil at higher market 
prices; it involves a transfer from the government to the final consumers without such a transfer 
appearing explicitly on state oil companies’ records or in the government budget. If this foregone 
revenue had been collected, it could have been used by the government in a variety of ways – for 
instance to reduce the budget deficit and the size of the public debt; to increase spending in more 
productive areas such as infrastructure, education, and health; to distribute it directly to its people; 
or to reduce, where applicable, taxation.28 Because losses in foregone revenues on government 
records are implicit, they are difficult for governments to convey to the public as real losses or 
costs. The lack of transparency about the size of implicit transfers, their direct and indirect costs, 
and the identities of the main beneficiaries, makes it difficult for governments to initiate energy 
pricing reform. 
2.4. Adjusting Fuel Prices 
In the Arab world, so far only Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco operate variations of rules-
based, automated fuel price adjustment mechanisms which pass through increases in the price of 
28 Gupta et al. (2003).
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imported fuels on international markets to the domestic economy.29  As shown in , the international 
pass-through to domestic fuel prices in the Middle East has been the lowest in the world. In the 
absence of fuel price adjustment mechanisms, regulated prices necessarily lead to a fluctuation in 
explicit and implicit energy subsidies following price movements for fuels in international markets. 
The results may be transparent or non-transparent in government budgets, but the consequences 
for the economy are not invisible, as will be further discussed in Section 3. 
tABlE 2: IntERnAtIOnAl pASS-tHROugH Of IntERnAtIOnAl fuEl pRICE RISES, 2006–7
gasoline Kerosene Diesel
2006 20071 20071 20071
net oil importers (median) 1.83 1.03 0.90 1.05
net oil exporters (median) 0.59 0.53 0.22 0.53
Whole sample (median) 1.72 0.90 0.85 1.01
Africa (median) 1.67 1.06 1.09 1.36
Asia (median) 2.15 1.36 0.65 0.94
europe (median) 1.75 1.30 - 1.61
middle east (median) 0.78 0.58 0.34 0.67
Western Hemisphere (median) 1.09 0.70 1.15 0.69
Memo items:
Countries in sample 42 42 24 37
Countries with full pass-through2 31 18 11 17
Within-year pass-through3 1.27 0.41 0.63 0.48
Countries with full within-year pass-through2 26 8 5 9
international fuel price increase (per cent)3 6.9 48.1 44.2 47.2
Source: Mati (2008)
Notes to Table:
unless otherwise indicated, 2003 is used as the reference year for all pass-through calculations
1 post-tax retail prices; latest observation for 2007
2 pass-through is defined as ‘full’ when it is greater than or equal to 1
3 Calculated using the end of the previous year as the reference point.
Table 3 presents the fuel price adjustment mechanisms used in various parts of the Arab world 
and the major recent changes in domestic fuel prices in each of the countries. As seen from this 
table, there is wide variation among Arab countries with many countries, mainly the net exporters, 
adopting an ad hoc approach to revising fuel prices. The table also shows that despite announce-
ments of plans to reform fuel prices in many countries, little progress has been made, which 
reveals the political difficulties involved in increasing energy prices and liberalizing this strategic 
sector. These issues are discussed in more details in Section 4.
29 In all four cases, the political uprisings in early 2011 impacted the effectiveness of these mechanisms via at least 
temporary reductions in their pass-through rates; See discussion further below.
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tABlE 3: fuEl pRICE ADjuStmEnt mECHAnISmS AnD RECEnt CHAngES  
tO pRICIng StRAtEgIES In ARAB COuntRIES
Country Retail 
fuel price 
mechanism
Recent Changes to Domestic fuel prices
net Energy 
Importing 
Countries
Jordan automatic increased fuel prices in 2005 and 2008, following which most prices 
reflected international prices. A committee formed of representa-
tives from the ministries of Finance, energy, and trade, and from the 
Jordanian petroleum refinery Company adjusts the prices of petroleum 
products monthly, based on a formula that follows the changes in the 
price of brent crude oil during the previous 30 days.30
in January 2011 Jordan temporarily suspended its automated adjust-
ment mechanism, owing to increased social and political pressure, and 
reduced prices and taxes on fuel.31
lebanon automatic Fuel price subsidies were de facto eliminated in october 2008 with the 
reintroduction of fuel excise taxes; final fuel prices are issued weekly via 
ministerial decree basing the price on cost (including distribution costs 
and station margins) plus fuel excise taxes.32
in early 2011, the lebanese government reduced fuel excise taxes in 
response to high world market prices and increasing domestic political 
tensions.33
morocco automatic After ad hoc fuel price rises in 1999 and 2005, morocco increased 
domestic prices in 2006 for all products, except butane/lpg, to reflect 
import prices at the time, and introduced an automated, index-linked 
adjustment mechanism that would adjust prices in proportion to 
international price variations exceeding 2%.34
rising costs of newly built-up fuel subsidies caused the country in 2011 
to contemplate a move from universal subsidies to targeted transfers in 
the future.35
tunisia automatic After ad hoc fuel price rises in 2005 and 2007, the government decided 
in January 2009 to cap the subsidies at the level they reached when oil 
cost $52 per barrel. Whenever the international price of oil exceeded 
the reference price of $52 per barrel by $10 over a period of three 
consecutive months, prices of petroleum products increase by an a 
priori fixed amount. in early 2010 the reference price was raised to $60 
per barrel.36
Small 
Energy 
Exporting 
Countries *
bahrain ad hoc
egypt ad hoc egypt has been discussing the phasing-out of fuel and electricity 
subsidies to private consumers and industry for years. the new govern-
ment, in the most recent statements, said it was studying the possibility 
of subsidy phase-out, after announcing in may 2011 that no rises to 
electricity prices were planned for the coming fiscal year.37
oman ad hoc
Syria ad hoc initially began a reform of fuel prices in 2008, after which original plans 
were to raise fuel prices every three months until they reached interna-
tional prices, owing to the large fiscal burden of fuel subsidies. First fuel 
price increases were coupled to public sector wage rises and rationed 
sales of diesel at lower prices to households.38
initial plans in early 2011 had been to follow a similar strategy to Jordan, 
by phasing out fuel subsidies completely, coupled to mitigation mea-
sures such as wage increases and new pension schemes. the eruption 
of political protests in march 2011 halted these plans.39
yemen ad hoc Fuel price rises in 2005 resulted in large-scale rioting and several dozen 
dead protesters.40
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large 
Energy 
Exporting 
Countries
Algeria ad hoc last fuel price rises in 1995 and 2000, followed by energy minister 
Chekib Khelil remarking in 2003 that energy subsidies should be phased 
out ‘earlier or late’. A draft at the time of the country’s Hydrocarbon law 
(later dropped by parliament) supposedly contained a framework and 
schedule for the progressive removal of subsidies for gas prices over a 
10-year period, and for petroleum products over a five-year period.41 
most recent remarks were made in 2008 in the context of Algeria’s Wto 
membership application, at which time Khelil denied the existence of 
subsidies on natural gas in Algeria.42
iraq ad hoc
libya ad hoc
Kuwait ad hoc last changes to petroleum product prices in 1999, partly in response to 
rising domestic consumption of refined products.43
Qatar ad hoc
Saudi Arabia ad hoc
uAe ad hoc most recent product price revisions 2001, 2004, 2005, and 2007, in 
response to losses made by distributors as a result of higher crude oil 
prices.44
Distributors proposed in 2001 introduction of an automated fuel price 
adjustment mechanism for retail prices, but the proposal failed to gain 
political support.45
Source: Authors; MEES; Ragab (2010), Various newspapers.
* less than 1 million b/d of oil equivalent
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
30 Ragab (2010, 3).
31 IMF (2011b, 47).
32 IMF Prices are published weekly at the Ministry of Energy and Water’s website at www.energyandwater.gov.lb/
pages.asp?Page_ID=44.
33 Blominvest Bank (2011); Now Lebanon (2011); Daily Star (2011). 
34 MEES (2006).
35 IMF (2011a, 9).
36 Ragab (2010, 3).
37 Daily News Egypt (2011). 
38 IMF (2010a, 10); MEES (2008); MEES (2011a).
39 MEES (2011a).
40 Guardian (2005).
41 MEES (2003).
42 Reuters (2008).
43 MEES (1999).
44 MEES (2001); MEES (2007).
45 MEES (2001).
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2.5. The Prevalence of Energy Subsidies in the Arab World
Energy subsidies, both explicit and implicit, are widespread in the Arab world. In the absence of 
consistent data from Arab countries, this paper relies on IEA estimates, which base the measure 
of national subsidization rates on a price-gap approach comparing domestic prices for oil, oil 
products, and natural gas with international shadow prices. According to IEA measures, Arab 
countries are among the largest subsidizers of energy in the world (see Figure 1). Six of the world’s 
ten largest subsidizers are found in the Arab world, led by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Each 
of these three countries charges their populations less than a third of international prices for fuel 
and electricity.
The effect of subsidies on Arab fuel prices can be illustrated by a cross-country comparison of 
average retail prices for gasoline and diesel (see Figure 2). Prices for fuel in the sample are lowest 
in the Arab Gulf countries, with considerable variance between gasoline and diesel prices in some 
of the Mashreq countries (Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) and North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco). If 
compared with a most basic indicator of cost (an average world crude oil price of 30 US cents/litre 
in 2010) it is clear that most Arab oil producers charge domestic users below the opportunity cost 
price of crude oil sold on international markets – a substantial loss in terms of foregone export 
revenue. In addition, Egypt and Yemen are both net importers of oil products, implying that their 
expenditure on fuel subsidies must be explicit in the case of all imported fuel – they incur actual 
fiscal losses from buying at full international prices and selling domestically at discounted prices. 
Source: IEA
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fIguRE 1: AvERAgE SuBSIDIzAtIOn RAtES fOR DOmEStIC fuElS 
In SElECtED COuntRIES (In %), 2010
23ArAb HumAn Development report reSeArCH pAper SerieS
Source: World Bank.
fIguRE 2: AvERAgE REtAIl pRICES fOR gASOlInE AnD DIESEl In SElECtED ARAB, 
OECD AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES (In uS$/lItRE), 2010
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3.   Evaluating Energy Subsidies  
in the Arab World
The Arab world comprises a number of very different economies, with varying objectives and 
practices of energy subsidy systems. Both explicit and implicit subsidies have nevertheless resulted 
in a number of unintended consequences that are shared across the region. A key message con-
veyed by the following evaluation is that while energy subsidies may partially achieve some of 
their intended objectives, they are costly to the Arab world in numerous ways. Energy subsidies 
distort price signals and create inefficiencies with serious implications on the allocation of scarce 
resources. They protect consumers from the need to adapt their consumption patterns to the rising 
cost of energy, and from investing in more energy-efficient technology, leading to over-consump-
tion and waste of subsidized energy by industries and households. Energy subsidies also tend 
to be socially regressive, with high income households and industries benefiting proportionately 
most from low energy prices. In many cases, energy subsidies have proven ineffective in securing 
macroeconomic stability. Finally, they carry important fiscal consequences, by contributing to 
increasingly unsustainable budget deficits.
3.1. unintended Consequences of Energy Subsidies
Efficiency
A rise in the energy intensity of GDP and low energy efficiency rates. The Arab world is among 
the most energy-intensive regional economies in the world, and the trend is towards an even greater 
rise in energy intensity. As Figure 3 below shows, total primary energy consumption per dollar 
of GDP (an indicator of energy intensity) over the past three decades has declined in all parts of 
the world, with the exception of the Arab world. Energy intensity growth rates in several Arab 
economies, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have risen particularly fast, and more 
than tripled in the UAE and Saudi Arabia alone since 1980. This growth is not a Gulf phenomenon 
alone, however; energy intensity in several other economies, such as Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, still 
increased by more than a third over the same period of time. In absolute terms, eight out of the 
world’s ten most energy-intensive economies are Arab countries, including Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Oman (see Figure 4). Even several Mashreq economies such as Egypt and Jordan 
whose industries are generally less energy-intensive, still require over 40 per cent more energy 
per unit of economic output than some of the world’s less energy-intensive economies such as 
Denmark or Spain.
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Low energy pricing, and the concentration of industrial activity on energy-intensive industries in 
several Gulf states, are two main contributors to the remarkable growth in energy intensity in the 
Arab economies. The two factors also mutually reinforce each other: a (perceived) abundance in 
low-cost energy favours the development of energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals 
and aluminium production, while their large-scale promotion as sunrise sectors in the economy 
provides an important, self-perpetuating argument by industry for governments to maintain low 
fIguRE 3: COmpOunD AvERAgE gROWtH RAtE Of EnERgy uSE (Kg Of OIl EquIvAlEnt) 
pER $1,000 gDp (COnStAnt 2005 ppp) In SElECtED ARAB, OECD, AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES, 
1980–2008
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
fIguRE 4: EnERgy uSE (Kg Of OIl EquIvAlEnt) pER $1,000 gDp (COnStAnt 2005 ppp)  
In SElECtED ARAB, OECD, AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES, 2008
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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pricing policies as a key factor in their country’s competitive advantage. However, subsidized 
energy also induces large inefficiencies into the way in which energy is consumed. Producer sub-
sidies protect firms from competitive pressure and discourage them from pursuing strategies to 
minimize energy costs, resulting in inefficiency and loss of competitiveness. They also distort price 
signals and may result in a misallocation of resources towards investments that would be much less 
profitable in the absence of subsidies. Losses due to energy inefficiency and the waste of scarce 
resources are a problem encountered throughout the Arab world, and they affect other industries 
such as power and water production (the latter being, in several Arab economies, contingent on the 
desalination of sea water, a chemical process requiring large amounts of electrical power).
As an illustration of this effect, Figure 5 shows the efficiency of power generation for selected Arab 
countries compared with other parts of the world. Although there has been a modest improvement 
in efficiency levels over the last two decades, most Arab countries are well below the world’s 
average in terms of efficiency of the power sector. Major Arab energy producers, including the 
UAE, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, are notably among the least energy efficient countries in the world 
in terms of domestic power generation. Even net importers such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, 
however, suffer from low energy efficiency rates in power generation compared with other devel-
oping regions, for instance Latin America.46 
fIguRE 5: EnERgy EffICIEnCy In pOWER gEnERAtIOn In SElECtED ARAB, OECD,  
AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES (%), 2009
46 A World Bank report on Lebanon’s electricity sector pre-2008 illustrates this point: ‘The continued use 
of gas-oil (diesel) in two major power plants (as well as in the gas turbines designed as peaking plants 
but used as base load plants due to insufficient capacity to serve demand) designed to use natural gas 
(despite the abundance of natural gas in the region), high O&M cost of all power plants due to insuf-
ficient regular maintenance and spare parts, as well as high technical losses, result in very high produc-
tion costs. Subsidies are estimated to have reached 4% of GDP in 2007, and 39% of total government 
spending between 1997 and 2006’. World Bank (2008, 5).
Source: ABB, Trends in Global Energy Efficiency 2011
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Similar conclusions apply to the region’s rapidly growing transport sector. A report by McKinsey 
in 2007 found that the fuel efficiency of private and public transport in the Middle East is excep-
tionally low: average fuel consumption per vehicle is more than double the average that prevails 
in countries without fuel subsidies.47 With large fuel subsidies effectively eliminating incentives 
for private and business transport to economize on the use of fuel (for instance, by choice of 
vehicle, choice of the number of trips, and choice of public transport), the Arab world wastes large 
revenue resources on inefficient modes of transport. McKinsey subsequently argues that out of the 
world’s total potential to make energy efficiency savings in the road sector, one third alone arises 
from the elimination of fuel subsidies in the highly subsidizing economies of the Middle East, 
and Venezuela.48
A rapid growth in consumption of the various primary fuels and electricity. Rising levels of energy 
intensity also reflect aggregate levels of energy consumption throughout these economies. As shown 
in Figure 6, during the period 1980 to 2008, total energy and electricity consumption in the Arab 
world grew fast – more than 5 per cent annually between 1980 and 2008 for total primary energy 
and more than 7 per cent for electricity – thereby outpacing real GDP and population growth. 
Total energy consumption in the Arab world more than tripled over this period, while electricity 
consumption rose over six times in three decades. The Arab world, along with the Middle East as 
a region, has hence become the second most important energy growth market for energy consump-
tion in the world – according to leading forecasts such as those by the IEA and EIA only Asian 
demand growth is higher.49 Among the fastest growing countries, both in aggregate and on a per 
capita basis for primary energy consumption, are oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, 
but also Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt, all of which have grown at rates above the Arab world’s aver-
age. For electricity, consumption growth well above the average has been led by Oman, Jordan, 
the UAE, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. All Arab countries’ demand for both primary fuels 
and electric energy has been far above the world trend, with world consumption growth for energy 
and electricity respectively being 1.85 per cent and 3.28 per cent compound average per annum 
between 1980 and 2008. In per capita terms, small GCC monarchies such as Qatar, Kuwait, and 
the UAE face among the highest energy consumption rates in the world (see Figure 7).
One notable consequence of rising domestic demand in the Arab world has been that several of the 
region’s former, or potential, exporters of oil or natural gas have in the past years turned into net 
importers. This has been the case in Egypt (for oil and oil products), Yemen (refined products), and 
the UAE and Kuwait (natural gas) – a paradoxical situation given these countries’ own substantial 
resource endowments.50 For large oil producers with substantial surpluses of production over and 
47 Notably, the Middle East region under this context includes Iran, which until 2010 was widely cited as the single 
largest subsidizer of domestic fuels in the world. Bressand et al. (2007, 15)
48 The ‘Middle East’ under this definition also includes Iran, at the time one of the world’s largest subsidizers of 
energy prices. Farrell et al. (2008, 21)
49 IEA (2010).
50 Kuwait has never exported natural gas, but has sizeable own reserves, production from which, however, currently 
falls short of domestic demand. The UAE, likewise, hold substantial own natural gas reserves but their develop-
ment has been slow, and own production is in parts tied up under long-term export contracts which account for 
the federation’s continued gas exports despite a rapidly growing domestic market in need of greater imports.
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above domestic needs, the rapid growth of domestic demand for crude oil furthermore implies the 
possibility of rapid erosion of their spare capacity. This point is of particular relevance for Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE – all large Arab oil producers, and key holders of spare capacity.51
51 Saudi Aramco’s CEO Khaled Al-Falih publically expressed his worries in 2010 about the levels of domestically 
consumed oil in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom currently burns as much as 1mn b/d in summer in power plants, out of 
a total production of some 8–8.5mn b/d in 2010. Al-Falih expressed worries that by 2028, exports could hence fall 
by as much as 3mn b/d. Kuwait has faced similar worries. Financial Times (2010); Bloomberg (2010); Financial 
Times (2011).
fIguRE 6: COmpOunD AvERAgE gROWtH RAtE fOR COnSumptIOn Of EnERgy, ElECtRICIty, 
REAl gDp, AnD pOpulAtIOn fOR tHE ARAB WORlD (AggREgAtE), 1980 – 2008
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
fIguRE 7: EnERgy uSE In SElECtED ARAB, OECD, AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES 
(Kg Of OIl EquIvAlEnt pER CApItA), 2008
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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Underinvestment in the energy sector where subsidies are poorly implemented. The widespread 
use of energy subsidies also has consequences on the rate of investment in the energy sector in parts 
of the Arab world. Caps on government subsidies to be paid to producers, or flat payment subsidies, 
may often not fully compensate domestic oil/gas producers, refineries, importers and distributors, 
and electricity producers for their incurred losses, and may undermine the rate of return on their 
investment. Specifically, by diverting funds away from state-owned enterprises and oil marketing 
companies and distributors, these companies will not be able to upgrade their internal capabilities, 
invest in new infrastructure, or shift to modern, cleaner, and more efficient technology. 
The result is often the provision of low quality services to end users, most visibly in the region’s 
electricity sectors. Irregular services with recurring power outages have characterized electricity 
provision throughout wide parts of the Arab world, typically in response to decade-long underin-
vestment in electricity generation on the one hand, and transmission and distribution networks on 
the other. In many parts of the Levant and the Arab Gulf, this situation is further exacerbated by 
a culture of non-payment of utility bills by some parts of the population, typically in response to 
the popular perception that utilities should be supplied at little or no cost by the state – the result 
of decades of low-cost utility provision by state-owned utility companies. In Levantine countries 
such as Lebanon and Jordan, non-payment by some population groups is, in part, also the result 
of continued electricity theft via illegal grid connections by households unable or unwilling to 
pay utility bills.52 In many cases, electricity theft and non-payment by some user groups come in 
combination with over-charging of other customer groups by electricity companies needing to 
recover costs. Recurring blackouts and long waiting times for new electricity connections for pri-
vate households and businesses are often the consequence, resulting in annual losses in foregone 
business activity and backup costs for the economies concerned.53
For some of the poorest parts of the Arab world, however, the consequences of underinvestment 
and lack of electricity grid access are even more staggering; lack of electrification in remote areas 
is known primarily in Yemen and in some rural parts of Morocco and Oman. Yemen, the Arab 
world’s most undersupplied country in terms of electricity, faces electrification rates of little more 
than half the population, the remainder lacking any form of electricity access – with severe con-
sequences for the country’s socio-economic development and poverty rates (see 1 for a detailed 
discussion).54 Yemen’s case is particularly startling given that the country remains a net exporter 
of energy. 
52 The rate of non-technical electricity losses in Lebanon (essentially losses through illegal household connections) 
in 2007 for instance stood at 18% of Lebanon’s total electricity generation, in addition to a high rate of technical 
losses of 15%. IMF (2007, 19).
53 The Lebanese electricity sector illustrates this point. Prior to the 2008 electricity sector reform, the situation was 
described by a World Bank country report in the following way: ‘Power outages are a daily occurrence in Lebanon 
and in some regions of the country the quality of electricity supply is particularly poor. No new power generation 
capacity has been added since the two combined cycle plants were installed in the 1990s. This has led to a massive 
investment by consumers and industry in backup arrangements. Indeed, this form of energy security is estimated 
to cost the population at least an additional 25% in spending on electricity per month. The interruption in supply 
by the utility, EdL, is furthermore estimated to cost industry close to US$400 million in sales losses’. World Bank 
(2008, 5).
54 See also El-Katiri and Fattouh (2011).
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BOx 1: unDERInvEStmEnt AnD ElECtRIfICAtIOn In yEmEn
yemen is one of the poorest Arab countries, despite the country’s comparable natural resource wealth in 
the form of oil and natural gas reserves. it is also perhaps the most energy-poor country in the Arab world, 
particularly in the area of electricity access. Strikingly, a mere 53% of the population has access to electricity, 
and only 36% of the total population are served through the country’s main public electricity Company 
(peC) grid, the rest being connected to village-based mini-grids or using self-generators run on mostly on 
diesel or gasoline.55 this is despite yemen not being, in principle, short of fuel for power generation: the 
country is a net exporter of crude oil and gas, though a net importer of petroleum products. Domestic 
fuels for consumption by households and industries are heavily subsidized, with government figures for 
electricity subsidies, in the form of fuel subsidies for the state producer and consumer subsidies, amounting 
to uS$1.1 billion in 2008.56 the share of the government budget taken by total energy subsidies to the 
economy is high: in 2009, some 22% of total government expenditure was spent on energy subsidies (34% 
in 2008), exceeding the expenditure on education and defence, and amounting to almost seven times the 
expenditure on health.57
lack of access to electricity in yemen is primarily a problem of infrastructure. both generation capacity 
in existing power plants, and the country’s transmission and distribution (t&D) network are insufficient. 
yemen’s total installed generating capacity in 2009 stood at 1,551 mW,58 for a population of 24 million 
people. per capita consumption of electricity in yemen is, at some 203 KWh per capita in 2009, only a tenth 
of the Arab world’s average of some 2,000 KWh.59 the country’s main peC grid connects mainly urban areas 
and the cities, and until now has entirely excluded the former South yemen. overall, 92% of urban house-
holds, but only 42% of rural ones have access to electricity. of those households not served with electricity, 
96% are in rural areas, making the lack of access to electricity an essentially rural problem.60 
Where there is grid access, both residential and industrial users experience occasional shortages and load 
shedding. Supply disruptions occur many times during the year as a result of old, inefficient generation and 
t&D infrastructure, technical failures, and the recurring shortage of fuel, particularly diesel, in power genera-
tion plants. this situation is also particularly damaging for businesses and industries, which incur substantial 
losses from load shedding and recurring power outages. An iFC enterprise Survey found that in 2010, more 
than 50 power outages were experienced countrywide, most of which lasted several hours, causing substan-
tial commercial losses for businesses. many smaller businesses hence make the extra investment in backup 
diesel-fired generators, which creates additional cost.61 
the main reason for this situation is long-term lack of investment in yemen’s utility sector – such as in 
new capacity, maintenance and repair of old t&D infrastructure, and expansion of yemen’s electricity grid 
towards southern and particularly rural communities. yemen’s public utility peC is severely under-funded, 
not least due to yemen’s government-regulated pricing system, which was originally intended to help poor 
people access electricity. With electricity prices having been held down artificially for years under an exten-
sive electricity subsidy system, peC has for many years been unable to recover its costs.62 in consequence, 
peC currently has neither the financial nor the physical capacity to make expensive large-scale investments 
in the extension of its main grid to remote provinces. electricity theft and the additional problem of 
non-payment subsequently aggravate the large financial losses to the peC, which further exacerbates the 
inability of peC to extend services or reduce charges to those with an official connection.63
55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
55 World Bank (2005a, 89).
56 Assamiee (2010).
57 For a detailed discussion of these data, see El-Katiri and Fattouh (2011); Breisinger et al. (2011).
58 Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Energy and Electricity (2009, 18).
59 Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Energy and Electricity (2009, 19).
60 World Bank (2005a, 89).
61 El-Katiri and Fattouh (2011).
62 See also World Bank (2005a, 94).
63 Assamiee (2010); Shaher (2011).
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Fuel Shortages. Price caps, which keep prices below market clearing levels, have also resulted in 
physical shortages of subsidized petroleum products and of natural gas in the Arab world. This 
is also the case where some, but not all, fuels are heavily subsidized, for instance in the case of 
low-priced kerosene, which is often substituted for more expensive diesel (legally or illegally), 
leading to kerosene shortages, particularly in some rural areas.64 Rapid increases in demand have 
led to rationing in refining companies, for instance in the case of petrol and diesel supplies to 
petrol stations in Jordan in November 2008,65 and in the Northern Emirates in June 2011.66 Yemen, 
on the other hand, has experience chronic fuel shortages for years, with no long-term solution 
other than the continued import of refined products.67 In Egypt, the government has had to resort 
to administrative controls to ration LPG cylinders, a system which is costly, inefficient, and open 
to abuse.
Distorting effects on economic diversification. Contrary to their initial intent, energy subsidies 
can distort economic diversification efforts and encourage rent-seeking behaviour. Aissaoui 
describes this effect in the Saudi Arabian context in the following way:
‘[…], while greatly benefiting the [petrochemical] industry, giving it a distinctive competitive advantage 
in terms of  variable costs, the prevailing [subsidized] pricing system encourages rent-seeking behavior. 
This might explain private entrepreneurs’ reluctance to invest into the more challenging tertiary 
processing of petrochemicals, or even be attracted to the so-called industrial parks (downstream plastic 
conversion industries planned in situ the refinery–petrochemical complexes), without securing a share 
of the rent in the form of low-priced feedstock.’68 
Particularly for the Arab world’s large energy producers, a more diversified economic base is 
essential not only in terms of greater (export) revenue diversity and more stable revenue flows, but 
also in terms of the quantity and quality of employment which existing industries can provide to 
their national populations. 
Heightened Incentives for Smuggling. Continued sharp price differences between fuels in neigh-
bouring Arab countries, owing to different subsidy regimes, have also incentivized large-scale fuel 
smuggling across borders. Fuel smuggling has been of particular concern among neighbouring 
64 Del Granado et al (2010, 13).
65 Jordan Times (2008).
66 Shortages in supply of transport fuels by the UAE’s national oil company ENOC in the Northern Emirates in sum-
mer 2011 caused ENOC in October 2011 to release an unusually open plea to policy makers: ‘With the summer 
months over, demand for fuel across the ENOC and EPPCO stations in Dubai has increased significantly. ENOC’s 
retail network across Dubai currently witnesses the heavy rush of motorists, especially during peak hours. The 
substantial rise in the price of fuel in the international markets – the highest ever recorded since 2008 – has put 
a severe burden on ENOC and EPPCO, which for many years have distributed and continue to distribute fuel to 
end-users at a highly subsidized rate. The cost of providing subsidized fuel to our customers is expected to lead to 
a loss of AED2.7 billion [US$735 million] for the company this year. This also has a serious impact on our ability 
to expand our retail network to meet the growing demand. Very few stations have been added in Dubai recently 
and a number of stations had to be closed to undertake infrastructure development work. The current scenario, 
where ENOC has to bear the burden of higher international fuel prices while at the same time distributing fuel at 
subsidized rates, is clearly not sustainable or viable for the company. ENOC looks forward to the support of the 
concerned authorities in addressing the concern’. Reuters, 15 October 2011.
67 World Bank (2005b).
68 Aissaoui (2012 forthcoming).
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countries in the Levant, such as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon; between Egypt and the Palestinian 
territories; across the closed borders between Algeria and Morocco, as well as (resulting from the 
2011 uprisings) between Tunisia and Libya,69 into and from Iraq and neighbouring countries; and 
from and to Yemen.70 Fuel smuggling has also become increasingly a problem for the wealthy 
Gulf states.71 Fuel smuggling not only contributes to illegal contraband trade, but in many cases 
substantially exacerbates existing fuel shortages in subsidizing countries. Countries such as Syria 
reported sharp reductions in observed patterns of cross-border smuggling in response to fuel 
price increases.72
Equity
The beneficiaries of energy subsidies. The provision of energy at low prices is not neutral in 
terms of the benefits. Those who consume the subsidized good most in society tend to benefit pro-
portionately the most from such subsidies – in the case of energy these are typically higher income 
households, since energy consumption rates increase alongside income levels for most types of 
energy, including electricity and transport fuels (gasoline, diesel).73 A recent study of the impact 
of energy subsidies on a group of 20 developing economies found that on average $97 out of $100 
in gasoline subsidies accrued to the sample’s four highest income groups, while only $3 actually 
accrued to the lowest income group – which had been intended to benefit from the subsidy. The 
largest share of subsidies, proportionately, was captured by the highest income group, which alone 
took more than 40 per cent.74 Universal subsidies for lower quality fuels such as kerosene were 
found to be slightly less regressive, owing to substantially higher consumption rates among lower 
income groups. However, leakages to unintended groups were still found to be large, with 20 per 
cent of kerosene subsidies being captured by the highest income group, compared with 19 per cent 
for the lowest one.75 The results hence show significant leakages of general energy subsidies to 
higher income groups, rendering energy subsidies an inefficient and costly way to protect the poor.
The value of energy subsidies, much of which have been seen to leak to high income groups, could 
have been invested into more effective channels that specifically target low income households, for 
instance through comprehensive social safety nets that involve benefits in cash rather than being 
tied to the consumption of energy; or into the provision of free public services such as health and 
education, which also provide substantially higher social returns than benefits bound to the con-
sumption of energy. For this reason, energy subsidies can be seen as socially regressive measures, 
where their main beneficiaries are not low income groups. Still, the removal of energy subsidies 
involves significant costs for low income groups. Because of their relatively low consumption of 
69 Algérie DZ (2008);  France 24 (2011). 
70 For instance, see Wahab, B.A. (2006, 53–9);  Bloomberg (2011). 
71 e.g. see Arab Times (2011).
72 IMF (2010a).
73 This is also, where applicable, natural gas/LPG. Kerosene, by contrast, tends to be proportionately consumed 
most by lower income households, but substantial leakages exist to higher income groups.
74 The study included five income groups in total. Del Granado et al (2010, 12–13).
75 Del Granado et al (2010, 12).
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energy, low income households often are unable to further reduce their consumption rates. Poor 
households are also hit proportionally hardest by second round effects of energy prices increases, 
for instance through increases in the price of products such as food, whose production and trans-
port entails raised energy input costs. Any reform of domestic energy prices that is not coupled to 
adequate compensatory measures, such as improved social protection, will hence result in a loss 
of welfare for the poorest in society. 
The Macro-Economy
A rapidly rising fiscal burden. International fuel price rises for oil and oil products since 2002 
have contributed substantially to the rapidly mounting burden of fuel and electricity subsidies in a 
number of Arab countries. For energy importing countries, this fiscal burden is mostly explicit – 
in the form of fiscal deficits, financed through domestic or foreign borrowing (although certain 
off-budget activities are less easy to quantify). In contrast, part or all of the fiscal cost of energy 
subsidies in the Arab oil producing countries remains implicit, as foregone revenue that could 
have been spent or invested in forward-looking investment funds. Table 4 below shows estimates 
by the IEA for the size and economic weight of energy subsidies in several Arab countries.76 For 
instance, the total value of energy subsidies estimated in the case of Egypt in 2010, US$20.28bn, is 
more than the equivalent of the country’s entire budgeted fiscal deficit of $19.2bn for 2010/2011, or 
9.3 per cent of nominal GDP.77 The enormous size of energy subsidies estimated for several Arab 
oil producers below is striking. Moreover, for oil and gas importers such as Syria, Jordan, and 
Morocco, the volume of domestically consumed fuel constitutes an enormous burden in the form 
of a drain on foreign exchange reserves.78
76 As discussed above, IEA estimates are based on a price-gap approach that compares national price levels for dif-
ferent fuels and electricity to some international benchmark/market price. Both the approach and outcome can be 
and are widely debated, with the Organization for Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) rejecting any approach that 
automatically compares domestic prices to international market prices (compare with the discussion in Section 
2.1. above). For the purpose of this paper, the IEA data is used to illustrate overall trends, though the data are not 
taken at their face value by the authors.
77 MENAFN (2010).
78 These countries’ experience is discussed in greater detail below.
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tABlE 4: IEA EStImAtES Of EnERgy SuBSIDIES In SElECtED ARAB COuntRIES, 2010
Average 
Rate of 
Subsidization 
(%)
Subsidy  
($ per 
person)
total 
Subsidy  
(% of gDp)
Subsidy by fuel
total 
Subsidy 
(uS$ bn)Oil gas Electricity
Algeria 59.80 298.40 6.60 8.46 0.00 2.13 10.59
libya 71.00 665.00 5.70 3.17 0.26 0.78 4.21
Egypt 55.60 250.10 9.30 14.07 2.40 3.81 20.28
Saudi 
Arabia 75.80 1,586.60 9.80 30.57 0.00 12.95 43.52
Iraq 56.70 357.30 13.80 8.87 0.28 2.16 11.31
Kuwait 85.50 2,798.60 5.80 2.81 0.90 3.91 7.62
qatar 75.30 2,446.00 3.20 1.15 1.41 1.59 4.15
uAE 67.80 2,489.60 6.00 2.65 9.99 5.51 18.15
Source: IEA
Controlling Inflation. One of the chief worries about rising oil or other commodity prices is the 
stimulus they can give to inflation. Generally, the experience of holding down fuel prices through 
administered controls in order to control inflation is extremely adverse, as it leads to distortions 
in the economy that have to be removed at a later stage. Furthermore, if not financed by cutting 
government expenditure in other areas or increasing taxes, financing energy subsides could induce 
inflationary pressures, for instance by increasing pressure on money creation.79 
The Environment
An increase in CO2 emissions and exacerbated local pollution. The impact of fuel subsidies on 
the environment is not straightforward. On the one hand, by lowering end-user prices to consumers 
or producers, subsidies can lead to higher energy use or reduce the incentive to conserve energy, 
with potential adverse environmental consequences such as increasing airborne emissions and 
greenhouse gases. On the other hand, not subsidizing petroleum products can increase dependence 
on more polluting sources of energy, and can discourage income-poor households from switching 
towards cleaner fuels and electricity. No matter whether the net benefit of energy subsidies on the 
environment is positive or negative, alternative means of facilitating energy access for low income 
households do exist, for instance in the form of more effective social security systems that rely on 
cash transfers, which would not result in the large inefficiencies encountered in the Arab world’s 
consumption of energy. The use of energy subsidies must hence be seen as not necessarily the only, 
or the most effective, way to protect access to cleaner energy sources.
It may safely be reasoned that the rapid rises in fuel and electricity consumption in some parts of 
the Arab world, coupled to a lack of incentives for energy users to rationalize energy consumption, 
79 Hope and Singh (1995); Saboohi (2001, 245–52).
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have contributed to a rapid increase in the region’s CO2 emissions. The smaller Gulf energy 
exporters Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain face some of the highest per capita CO2 emission 
rates in the world – Qatar, with more than 50 metric tons per capita, lies more than ten times above 
the world average of 4.6 tons. While countries such as Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan face far lower 
rates, their emissions levels have grown quickly in the past three decades alongside most of the 
Arab world, in contrast with a negative growth trend in many OECD countries. Since the 1980s, 
the compound average growth rate in the Arab world’s per capita CO2 emissions was 1.36 per cent 
per annum, more than six times the world average of 0.20 per cent per annum.
fIguRE 8: CO2 EmISSIOnS In SElECtED ARAB, OECD, AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES 
(mEtRIC tOnS pER CApItA), 2007
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
fIguRE 9: COmpOunD AvERAgE gROWtH RAtE Of pER CApItA CO2 EmISSIOnS In SElECtED 
ARAB, OECD, AnD nOn-OECD COuntRIES (mEtRIC tOnS pER CApItA), 1980–2007
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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Some forecasters, such as McKinsey, suggest that the Middle East including Iran could indeed 
become a major CO2 emitter in the coming decade; in a recent report, the company sees the region 
to be contributing a total 10 per cent of world CO2 emissions in 2020.80
Low prices of hydrocarbon-based electricity generation discourage the development of alter-
native energies such as wind and solar. In terms of attributes, the Arab world could be one of the 
most varied regions in respect of primary energy sources used, benefitting from access to many 
potential renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. Interest from the region in solar 
energy has increased substantially over the past decade, partly in response to the growing energy 
needs of many parts of the region, and to advances in technology and cost profiles.81 Initiatives 
such as the EU-funded Dersertec project in North Africa and the Levant provide encouraging evi-
dence of the feasibility of large-scale projects of this kind in the region.82 Like renewable energy, 
nuclear power has not yet made its way into the region, although several research reactors, as well 
as technology links, exist with Europe and Asian countries.83 
While there is no lack of government plans to invest in more alternative energies in the region, the 
fact remains that up until now, the Arab world relies for over 95 per cent of its energy needs on oil 
and natural gas. Four countries – Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, and Syria – account for the bulk of the 
remaining 5 per cent, owing to the substantial contribution of hydropower and small amounts of 
coal to power generation. Morocco and Egypt are also the only two Arab countries studied in this 
paper with some considerable contribution of solar power, but their combined installed capacities 
of some 670MW in 2009 still contribute less than 1 per cent of the Arab world’s total of 168 GW 
installed generating capacity. This general lack of energy diversity in the region may be seen as 
being due to a number of different obstacles, including the wide availability of oil and natural 
gas which are superior to renewables as a source of energy, technical challenges surrounding 
renewable technologies such as dusk effects, the political sensitivity of nuclear power, but also the 
wide availability of governmental subsidies for oil and natural gas, but typically not for alternative 
energies in electricity generation.
80 Bressand et al. (2007, 29).
81 For example, see a recent World Bank initiative supporting solar power projects in Morocco and Egypt: http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22866325~menuPK:394
9143~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:256299,00.html; Friedman (2011); The largest renewables proj-
ect in operation in the region so far is the UAE’s Masdar City, whose aim is to run entirely carbon-neutral with 
only renewable energy sources used. See the city’s website at www.masdar.ae/en/home/index.aspx.
82 For more information see the Desertec Foundation website, www.desertec.org/en/global-mission/.
83 For an overview over MENA countries’ nuclear initiatives see Ebinger et al. (2011). See also, for instance, Maree 
(2008).
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This lack of diversity of energy sources in the Arab world is not only of concern from an envi-
ronmental point of view; it also a source of concern from a national energy security point of view 
– specifically in view of the increased reliance on volatile energy prices and, in the case of natural 
gas, long-term trade partners, either by pipeline or via LNG contracts. A recent illustration of the 
downside of this dependency has been Jordan’s experience with repeated gas disruptions from 
Egypt, its main trade partner, following political turmoil in the first half of 2011 (Egypt supplies 
more than 80 per cent of Jordan’s natural gas).84 A more diversified energy base may hence make 
sense from more than one perspective in the long run, and not only for Jordan.
3.2. Case Study: Energy Subsidies, Investment, and Income Distribution  
in Egypt
Energy subsidies comprise a substantial share of government expenditure in Egypt. The Egyptian 
Government (GOE) subsidizes all petroleum products and natural gas regardless of whether these 
fuels are consumed by households or by industry, or whether they are the fuel choice of the poor 
or the rich. In 2009/2010, petroleum subsidies reached E£66.5 billion (US$11.2 billion), constitut-
ing 5 per cent of GDP, 18 per cent of total government expenditure, and 24.7 per cent of total 
government revenues.85 This figure, however, does not reflect the true cost of energy subsidies. The 
production sharing agreements between the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC)/
Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) and foreign oil and gas companies allocate a 
84 Darbouche and Fattouh (2011, 29).
85 Kandil (2010).
fIguRE 10: InStAllED ElECtRICIty gEnERAtIOn CApACIty By typE 
Of gEnERAtIOn In SElECtED ARAB COuntRIES (mW), 2009
Source: Arab Union of Electricity Producers, Statistical Bulletin 2009
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share of the oil and gas extracted to the Egyptian partner. If the state-owned companies require 
more oil or gas to satisfy local demand, then they purchase these fuels from their foreign partners 
at prices close to those in international markets. 
The government calculates the size of the subsidy on the basis of the difference between the price 
at which the national company buys from the foreign contractor, and the low price at which it 
sells in the market. In other words, the GOE just calculates the financial cost, not the opportunity 
cost involved in selling petroleum products and natural gas at reduced prices in the local market.86 
If energy subsidies are calculated on the basis of the opportunity cost, then their size as a ratio 
of GDP would be much higher: between budget years 2002/2003 and 2010/2011, official figures 
estimate the total amount of energy subsidies at E£368 billion (US$61.6 billion). Based on the 
opportunity cost, the cost of subsidies totals E£736 billion (US$123.3 billion).87
Egypt’s energy pricing policy has distorted price signals and resulted in the misallocation of invest-
ment towards energy-intensive industries, thus driving investment away from labour-intensive 
industries that have greater capacity to absorb new entrants into the labour market. Simulation 
results suggest that increasing domestic energy prices to cost within a five-year period will cause 
the average annual growth for energy-intensive industries to fall below the reference path (in the 
reference case, it is assumed that no energy pricing reform will take place).88 This is in contrast to 
‘Other Industries’ which sees its average annual growth increase by around 1.5 percentage points 
above the reference path. Consequently, the share of ‘Other Industries’ in GDP will rise, while that 
of energy-intensive industries will fall following the reform of energy prices. Low domestic energy 
pricing has also distorted the fuel allocation decision between the domestic use of gas and the 
relatively more profitable export of gas. This in turn has discouraged national energy companies 
from undertaking investment in new local energy infrastructure, which has adversely affected 
energy access, especially in rural areas.  
Contrary to their original intent, energy subsidies in Egypt have been found to have a regressive 
impact on income distribution. Table 5 below reveals the share of petroleum subsidies received 
by households in different expenditure quintiles. In both urban and rural areas, households at the 
upper part of the income distribution tend to benefit proportionately more from energy subsidies. 
In urban areas, households in the top (fifth) quintile capture 33 per cent of energy subsidies com-
pared to only 3.8 per cent for those in the lowest quintile. In rural areas, the disparity is less, but 
the pattern is the same: households in the top quintile capture the largest share of energy subsidies. 
86 Mabro (1998, 2006).
87 See Mabro (1998, 2006); Kandil (2010).
88 Abouleinein et al (2009).
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tABlE 5: DIStRIButIOn Of pEtROlEum SuBSIDIES By ExpEnDItuRE quIntIlE In uRBAn 
AnD RuRAl Egypt
Expenditure group urban Rural
quintile 1 3.8 5.6
quintile 2 5.3 6.1
quintile 3 7.4 6.7
quintile 4 11 7.9
quintile 5 33.3 12.8
Source: Abouleinein et al (2009)
For some petroleum products the disparity is particularly large. In terms of gasoline, the World 
Bank finds that 93 per cent of the benefits go to the highest quintile (See Table 6). This is to be 
expected since car ownership is heavily concentrated within high income households. A similar 
picture also emerges for natural gas, since Egypt’s gas network is not available in rural areas 
where the majority of the poor reside. Research conducted by the World Bank finds that 44 per 
cent of the rich in urban areas in Lower Egypt have access to natural gas, while only 10 per cent 
of the urban poor have access to the network.89 A major obstacle to new gas connections is the 
inability of low-consumption households (typically the poor) to cover the costs of connection, 
even if a scheme to spread these payments over time is made available to them.90 This situation 
is exacerbated by the large losses incurred by EGAS from selling gas and LPG to the domestic 
market, which render the company unable to meet the financing requirements of connecting the 
residential sector to natural gas.91
tABlE 6: ABSOlutE tRAnSfERS RECEIvED fROm OIl AnD gAS By HOuSEHOlD COnSumptIOn 
ExpEnDItuRE quIntIlE (mOntHly lE pER CApItA)
product 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Overall
Kerosene 2.51 1.97 1.49 1.25 0.74 1.61
natural gas 0.12 0.31 0.49 0.75 3.13 0.96
gasoline 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.28 7.53 1.59
lpg 6.23 8.22 9.32 10.68 10.89 9.13
Above four products 8.88 10.55 11.48 12.96 22.29 13.29
Source: World Bank (2005c), Table 4.6
The inequity resulting from the current energy pricing system is also illustrated by the pricing of 
fuels to industry. Energy-intensive industries in Egypt achieve relatively high profit ratios when 
compared with similar industries in other parts of the world.92 This partly due to subsidized energy 
89 World Bank (2005c).
90 Gerner and Sinclair (2006).
91 Gerner and Sinclair (2006).
92 Khattab (2007).
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products and partly to their monopoly power, which allows these industries to avoid passing on the 
cost reductions from low energy prices to end consumers. This has important distributional con-
sequences, as the benefits from energy subsidies accrue mainly to the owners of energy-intensive 
plants, who are likely to fall within the highest income brackets.
Given the regressive nature of energy subsidies, reforming Egypt’s energy pricing system would 
have the potential to substantially increase total welfare. Research by the World Bank finds that 
the distribution of half of the budgetary savings from subsidy elimination equally across the 
population would have a bigger impact on poverty reduction than continuing with the status quo, 
an indication of the inadequate targeting of current subsidies.93 Similarly, using a CGE model, 
Abouleinein et al find that reform of energy prices associated with well-targeted cash transfers 
will benefit the poor more than the rich, resulting in large improvement in income distribution 
measures.94
In principle, the GOE could engage in some form of targeting in an attempt to reduce subsidy 
costs and to limit the leakage to high income groups. However, it has as yet refrained from doing 
so, which suggests that there are institutional, administrative, and/or political constraints that 
prevent the government from undertaking a more targeted approach to fuel subsidies. The unfold-
ing political events in Egypt which resulted in the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 
in 2011 are likely to delay much needed energy pricing reform. In fact, rather than decreasing, 
energy subsidies in the 2011/12 budget increased to around E£95 billion (US$16 billion), up more 
than 40 per cent since the 2009/10 budget. There is wide recognition that energy pricing reform is 
much needed since, as Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister Hazim Al-Biblawi stated in August 2011, ‘it 
is not reasonable for the government to subsidize the wealthy at the expense of the poor’.95 There 
are also calls for energy-intensive industries to improve their productivity levels ‘rather than use 
the excuse of low productivity to seek lower energy prices’.96 Despite many plans for energy price 
reform in the last few years, no concrete steps have been made, and it is most likely that social and 
political pressures will force any future government to delay such a reform, at least in the short- to 
medium-term.
93 World Bank (2005c).
94 Abouleinein et al (2009).
95 A statement issued by Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Hazim al-Biblawi on 27 August, 
2011. MEES (2011c).
96 A statement issued by Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Hazim al-Biblawi on 27 August, 
2011. MEES (2011c).
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4.  Reforming Energy Subsidies in the Arab World
The reform of energy prices in the Arab world remains a politically and economically challenging 
task. The wave of political uprisings that has confronted Arab governments across the region since 
early 2011, more than any other single factor, has rendered these challenges all the more important. 
Key to making the future reform of energy prices in the Arab world politically feasible, will be 
the ability and willingness of governments to address the economic and social costs that energy 
price rises will entail; by designing price reforms in ways that fit national circumstances, and by 
putting in place effective mitigation measures that protect the poorest and assist the economy in its 
long-term adaptation. This section first highlights some of the potential social and economic costs 
of subsidy reform; it then discusses different options available to governments for the design and 
mitigation of pricing reforms. It concludes with some recent experience of reform from within the 
Arab world – a case study of fuel and electricity price reform in Jordan. 
4.1. Social and Economic Costs of Subsidy Reform
Governments face a number of real challenges when revising their energy pricing systems. 
Although energy subsidies are a costly and are a regressive way of distribution, reducing or elimi-
nating energy subsidies in the absence of compensatory programmes will impact real incomes and 
lead to a decline in households’ welfare. The effect of the removal of energy subsidies on house-
holds will be two-fold: directly, through higher prices of consumed energy such as electricity and 
household fuels; and indirectly, through higher prices for other consumer goods that use energy 
as an intermediate input.97 Energy is typically an important part of the consumer basket but other 
consumer goods such as food – the price for which is often also a function of energy inputs during 
production, transport, and storage – can substantially increase the cost of living for all household 
groups. Given the relatively high energy intensity of many Arab countries’ economies, energy 
pricing reform is likely to induce a large indirect effect on households’ income. Low income 
households are usually impacted most adversely, because of low levels of consumption and lack of 
ability to further compromise the consumption of essential goods such as food and energy in the 
face of rising living costs. 
Energy pricing reform can also affect the competitiveness of domestic industries and firms. Higher 
energy prices associated with pricing reform have the effect of increasing the cost of industrial 
inputs, which could include input fuels (natural gas, electricity, crude oil, gasoline), or oil-based 
products such as raw materials for plastic industries, asphalt for the construction sector, and 
chemical fertilizers for agricultural activities. This direct effect increases the output price of other 
97 For a detailed discussion see, for instance, Del Granado et al (2010).
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industries, which in turn causes a new round of indirect cost effects. Depending on the industry’s 
competitive structure and the ability of firms to pass the increased cost on to final consumers, the 
increase in the cost structure reduces the profit margins of domestic industries, eroding their global 
competitiveness. This could also make it harder for such firms to secure funding, increasing the 
cost of financing new projects and undermining their long-term investment plans. The industries 
that are likely to be affected the most are those with high energy intensity, and those that face high 
competition (such as petrochemicals) and/or price controls (such as electricity) that prevent them 
from passing on rising costs to final consumers. In the long run, industrial establishments/firms 
have the option to adjust their production technology (at least partially) to offset the burden of 
increased input costs. However, long-term adjustments require that firms survive in the short-term 
and have access to funds, via internal or external financing, to implement technology adjustment 
and upgrading processes.
The impact of energy pricing reform on industry can also operate through the demand side. 
Specifically, the cost shock associated with energy pricing reform may result in underutilization 
of capacity. This in turn lowers employment and reduces overall demand, causing a reduction in 
economic activity.98
Thus, energy pricing reform could induce wide macroeconomic effects through a variety of chan-
nels. Abouleinein et al99 constructed a CGE model for Egypt, to estimate the potential impact of 
energy subsidy removal on key macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, consumption, exports, 
imports, and investment. In one of the scenarios, they consider the case in which energy prices are 
lifted to their cost (the average price level of petroleum products increases by 831 per cent). In the 
absence of any compensatory measures, they find that the impacts on key macroeconomic indica-
tors such as GDP, total private consumption, and export activity are negative. Adjusting prices to 
the cost of production also induces a sharp increase in the consumer price index. 
Against these short-term effects, in the long term energy price reform can improve the economy’s 
growth prospects through improving the productivity of capital, technological innovations, and 
international competitiveness, and by reducing energy intensity. For instance, Hang and Tu100 find 
a strong link between high energy prices and lower energy intensity in China. Similarly, in the 
context of Central and Eastern Europe, Cornillie and Fankhauser101 concluded that an increase in 
energy prices was the most important driver of efficient energy use.
In terms of its impact on inflation, increases in energy prices could be deflationary in the medium 
term. Specifically, the policy of removing subsidies/raising energy prices is like an increase in 
indirect tax.102 Since fuels and electricity are components of the CPI, an increase in their prices 
will be reflected in an increase in measured inflation (the first round effect). Initial evidence from 
regional energy price reformers – Jordan and Iran – suggests that these initial price spikes can be 
98 Clements, Gupta, and Jung (2003).
99 Abouleinein et al. (2009).
100 Hang and Tu (2007, 2978–88).
101 Cornillie and Fankhauser (2004, 283–95).
102 Its effects are the same as a policy of increasing the tax on fuel and domestic energy.
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high, although consumer price inflation levels fall sharply in the months after the reform.103 As this 
first-round effect feeds through into the economy, the real incomes and spending power of those 
who pay the higher prices fall. Thus, such a policy is price-raising but deflationary in the medium 
term. The first-round effects are likely to be one-off effects and to disappear within a relatively 
short period of time. 
The risk is that first-round effects could induce second-round inflationary effects. This may occur 
for instance if, in response to the increase in the cost of living, workers demand an increase in 
wages to compensate for the loss in their real income, or if governments respond by increasing 
public wages. Second-round price effects are likely to be more prolonged, especially if inflation 
is built into economic agents’ expectations. The strength of the second-round effect varies across 
countries, and depends on factors such as the strength of labour unions, the balance of power 
between employers and employees, the unemployment rate, and the credibility of monetary policy. 
Generally, a credible inflation-countering strategy often results in a low and stable inflation envi-
ronment which helps anchor inflation expectations. This in turn will influence the price-setting 
behaviour of agents in the economy, reducing the risk that first-round inflation feeds into second-
round effects.
4.2. Reform Options  
The Size and Timing of Subsidy Reform
Governments have the choice to eliminate implicit and explicit subsidies and to move prices to their 
cost or shadow cost level.104 In the case of traded goods such as oil, natural gas, and oil products, a 
reform can go all the way to bring the final prices broadly into line with international prices, or to a 
price above the marginal cost but below international prices. For non-tradable goods and essential 
services such as electricity and water, it can equate the price with the cost of production. A fast 
and comprehensive reform involving moving prices for all fuels and electricity to their respective 
shadow cost or marginal cost level across consumer sectors can have many advantages, including 
the maximization of fiscal savings and hence funds being available for mitigation measures. It will 
also generate a maximum demand response in the form of reduced total energy consumption and 
changed consumption patterns via a clear price signal. 
However, comprehensive subsidy reforms also maximize initial price increases, and in consequence 
maximize the price shock to the economy. Particularly during times of existing political protests, 
government may be reluctant to engage in a reform of such a magnitude. A potential option in such 
cases is a gradual reform of energy prices, which spreads out price rises over multiple steps and 
over a period of several months up to several years. The potential gains for the economy include 
smaller, individual price rises, and more time for structural adaptation. Nevertheless, gradual price 
reforms come with their own costs, including the risk of protracted inflation and rising inflationary 
103 IMF (2011c), IMF (2009).
104 See Section 2.1. for definitions.
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expectations, and an inherent risk of future policy reversions in response to popular opposition 
to consecutive price rises. Gradual reforms also reduce initial fiscal savings, and hence the funds 
available for mitigation schemes such as compensatory cash transfers.
Mitigation Measures
Evidence from both within and outside the Arab world suggests that coupling the reform of 
domestic energy prices to a set of effective mitigation measures can help governments to minimize 
the social and economic cost of subsidy reforms. Well-implemented mitigation schemes can help 
protect low income groups against an erosion of their real incomes; can protect the domestic 
demand base for industries and businesses; and can help raise public acceptance of pricing reforms 
considerably. Governments have multiple strategic tools at their disposal, including a range of 
options to redistribute revenue proceeds from energy price rises. The choice of reform strategies 
depends on the specific country context, which can include the size of price increases (and hence 
the revenue proceeds available for distribution), the fiscal soundness of government budgets, the 
administrative feasibility of targeted or untargeted benefit schemes, the effectiveness of existing 
social welfare nets, as well as the extent of existing levels of absolute poverty within the reforming 
country. The following provides a brief overview of some of the main mitigation options.
Targeted Energy Subsidies are a way of reducing the total fiscal burden of subsidies coupled to 
the continuation of some, usually limited, subsidies for specific beneficiary groups. According 
to a recent UNEP report, ‘targeting subsidies effectively so that their benefits are limited to a 
clearly defined targeted group should be the first consideration in designing or reforming a subsidy 
programme’.105 Beneficiaries can include particular sectors of the economy, for instance industry 
users (including energy-intensive industries which derive much of their international cost-compet-
itiveness from the availability of low-cost fuel and feedstock for their production);106 households; 
or, within the category of households, particular income groups whose consumption levels are 
secured through the provision of limited quantities of certain fuels, and low-priced electricity. 
Alternatively, governments can engage in categorical targeting, by subsidizing fuels or electricity 
deemed to be consumed primarily by the targeted group. Categorical targeting is fairly simple 
to administer, it is based on the strong assumption that poverty differs between categories but is 
similar within categories. Kerosene remains the most widely used type of fuel by the poor in many 
countries; LPG has been subsidized to help more poor households access this relatively cleaner 
and more efficient source of energy in, for example, Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen. 
However, experience has shown that targeted subsidies are often very difficult to implement 
in practice, owing to other factors or costs involved that may outweigh the benefits of targeted 
subsidies.107 First, targeted subsidies involve administrative costs such as acquiring information 
105 UNEP (2008, 22)
106 In addition industries, unlike households, have very few alternatives to energy subsidies if their cost structures 
under the new pricing regime render them uncompetitive vis-à-vis international competition, even after energy 
efficiency investment has been made.
107 Van de Walle (1998); Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004).
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about a target group and conducting surveys to identify more target groups. The more precise the 
information required, the higher the administrative costs, and the lower the budget available for 
distribution. In countries where administrative capacities are limited, often in combination with 
large, informal economies, a particularly high potential exists for corruption and limited targeting 
success. Targeted programmes also tend to involve private costs (e.g. for the provision of official 
papers), and can carry social stigma, which limits take-up rates. The empirical evidence on the 
impact of targeted subsidies on poverty is not conclusive,108 especially if targeted programmes 
undermine the political support for the programme and/or generate deadweight loss.109
In countries where substantial subsidies are extended to industry, there is a strong case for abolish-
ing subsidies on fuels used by industry. Evidence from Egypt suggests that subsidies to industries 
do not help alleviate poverty.110 Instead, fuel subsidies result in a concentration of profits in owners’ 
hands and an overinvestment in relatively less efficient sectors of the economy. Providing fuel 
subsidies to producers in order to control increases in consumer prices is also unlikely to work, 
because cost reductions are not necessarily fully passed on to consumers. Whether these savings 
will be passed on to consumers depends on the market structure, the degree of competition, and in 
case of monopoly, the effectiveness of the regulator. Evidence from Egypt suggests that removing 
fuel subsidies to industries is much less controversial than removing subsidies to households.111 
This is particularly the case where the profit margins for these industries are quite high and they 
are hence in a good position to absorb the rise in fuel prices.
Targeted Cash Transfers. The most ambitious reform is to eliminate all fuel subsidies and use 
budgetary savings to finance targeted transfer programmes directed towards the poor. Targeted 
transfers are typically based on two types of targeting mechanisms: administrative targeting in 
which the government or the programme administrators determine who will be eligible to partici-
pate or receive the benefit, on the basis of a set of criteria. In most cases, criteria involve either a 
form of income-testing, or specific contingencies such as unemployment, or a combination of both. 
Self-targeting mechanisms, by contrast, entail a transfer coupled to the subsidy for all, which is 
designed in such a way, however, that only low income groups have an incentive to use it. 
Targeted transfers have many advantages over other distributive schemes: unlike targeted sub-
sidies on energy prices, cash transfers do not link benefits to fuel consumption, and hence avoid 
gaps typically associated with pro-poor fuel subsidies; nor do they result in the kind of economic 
distortions associated with general fuel subsidies, such as wasteful energy consumption behaviour 
and lack of efficiency. By being income- or contingency-based, targeted transfers also minimize 
leakages to unintended groups, in comparison with universal subsidy or transfer programmes. 
Cash transfers are by nature transparent, because they appear as budgeted government spending 
on public accounts. Revising cash transfer programmes at a later stage is typically more accepted 
by the public than are multiple, large price revisions for fuels and electricity. Households also tend 
108 Besley and Kanbur (1993); van de Walle (1998); Ravallion (2003).
109 Ravallion (2003).
110 See Section 3.2. for a detailed analysis of the Egyptian case.
111 e.g. Abouleinein et al (2009).
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to prefer cash transfers to direct subsidies, given that they do not link benefits to energy consump-
tion, and enable households to have a choice over how to spend their benefits. 
The Syrian case illustrates experience with fuel price rises in combination with targeted transfers. 
Largely unnoticed by the international press, Syria considerably reformed its fuel prices in 2008, 
more than tripling the price for diesel (through part of this increase was taken back in 2009), and 
raising prices for fuel oil, kerosene, and gasoline by more than a third. Price rises were accom-
panied by public sector wage rises, and an additional rationing coupon system by which each 
household was allowed to buy up to 1,000 litres of diesel at a subsidized price. The coupon system 
was replaced in 2009 by targeted cash transfers. Targeting criteria included a combination of fac-
tors such as income, asset ownership, and the size of households’ utility bills. The IMF estimates 
that approximately half of all Syrian households qualify for the transfer.112 Since 2008, the Syrian 
government has increased prices for some fuels further, coupled to renewed heating oil allowances 
for public sector employees and pensioners. In January 2011, prior to the breakout of political 
protest in Syria, the government announced the creation of a National Welfare Fund,113 designed 
to compensate low income households for future fuel price rises, although its implementation has 
been held up at the time of writing owing to the outbreak of political protest in March 2011.
Like targeted subsidies, targeted transfers can suffer from systematic shortcomings such as 
administrative and private costs, problems in assessing income levels, and identifying beneficia-
ries, leading to incomplete coverage, as well as social stigma. Unsuccessful targeted programmes 
can cause of loss of political support for the scheme and hence reduce the allocation of resources 
devoted to it.114 For this reason, Van de Walle also notes that ‘narrow targeting often has hidden 
costs, and once these costs are considered, the most finely targeted policy may not have any more 
effect on poverty than a broadly targeted one’.115   
The Use of Existing Social Safety Nets. A fast and cost-effective way of reforming energy prices is 
to mitigate the effects by using available safety nets. Where a social safety net already exists, the 
budgetary savings from eliminating subsidies can be used to expand the size of the programme. 
Jordan, following its reform of fuel prices in 2005 and 2008, stepped up, reformed, and expanded 
its social safety networks, for instance through special budgetary allocations to the country’s 
National Aid Fund. The country also raised public sector workers’ wages (an example of public 
employment functioning as a de facto social safety network), introduced a separate compensation 
scheme for private sector employees, and upgraded its existing food subsidy programme (see also 
Section 4.3. for a more detailed discussion).116 As part of the Jordanian social security programme, 
more than 50 per cent of the workforce is now covered by social insurance against unemployment 
and illness. The country also introduced statutory retirement and early retirement ages for men 
and women, and considerably enhanced pensions protection.117 Syria similarly coupled its 2008 
112 IMF (2010a, 10).
113 Syria Today (2011).
114 Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004).
115 Van de Walle (1998, 231).
116 World Bank (2010, 90); Arabian Business (2008). 
117 Social Security Corporation (2009).
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fuel price rises to a 25 per cent increase in public sector wages, in addition to other compensatory 
schemes.118 
Egypt, on the other hand, illustrates that the use of existing safety nets is not always the best 
option. The country has three main safety nets: a consumer food subsidy programme; a cash trans-
fer programme to the unemployable poor; and a social fund programme. The food programme 
provides subsidized bread and flour to all Egyptians, in unlimited quantities. In addition, holders 
of ration cards can benefit from rationed goods such as sugar, cooking oil, rice, and tea which 
are available in limited quantities. There are two types of ration cards: a low-subsidy ration card 
which is theoretically available to all Egyptians (except those who let their card expire by not 
using it for three months) and a high-ration card which is intended to target individuals meeting 
certain criteria. One could suggest that these existing ration cards could be used to distribute fuel 
subsidies. However, this assumes that existing safety nets are efficient at targeting the poor. This is 
not the case in Egypt, where evidence suggests that existing safety nets are ineffective in reaching 
the poor and are unable to raise them above poverty levels. For instance, in the case of ration cards, 
the World Bank found that poor Egyptians are less eligible for a high-subsidy ration card than 
non-poor Egyptians, as the eligibility criteria (for instance being a pensioner or a public sector 
employee) are not pro-poor.119 Similar conclusions probably apply to the Syrian model, which 
similarly links some compensation schemes for higher fuel prices to the same criteria. In the case 
of Egypt, these regressive eligibility criteria are also not well enforced – more than two-thirds 
of those holding high-subsidy ration cards do not meet the relevant criteria. As a result of these 
inefficiencies, households in the top quintile receive around 20 per cent of subsidies of the rationed 
products, compared with less than 16 per cent for the lowest quintile. In terms of coverage, a third 
of the poor are excluded from the benefits of ration card subsidies because they do not have cards. 
Universal Programmes. An alternative mitigation measure – given the limitations of alternatives 
such as implementing a narrowly targeted programme, some form of categorical targeting, or the 
use of existing social safety nets – could be the elimination of energy subsidies in favour of a system 
of universal, unqualified cash transfers. There are indeed many arguments in favour of untargeted 
transfers. First, they minimize errors of exclusion. In a survey of nine developing countries, Cornia 
and Stewart found that universal food subsidies are associated with significantly lower errors of 
exclusion than targeted programmes.120 Second, developing targeted transfer programmes requires 
administrative capabilities which are often not readily available, are very costly to develop, and 
may be more open to corruption. Third, untargeted transfer programmes are more likely to suc-
ceed and survive, since these programmes receive wider political support than targeted transfer 
programmes.121 Finally, making transfers conditional on certain criteria – such as the level of 
income of the household – can induce behavioural responses that reinforce poverty. For instance, 
households may be reluctant to increase their income above a certain level, or to report such an 
increase, in order to avoid losing generous transfer entitlements, or they may decide to reduce 
118 IMF (2010a, 10).
119 World Bank (2005c).
120 Cornia and Stewart (1993)
121 Cornia and Stewart (1993); Skocpol (1991); Gelbach and Pritchett (2002).
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their labour supply. Universal subsidies, on the other hand, generate only an income effect but no 
substitution effect and thus are expected to have a less significant impact on work incentives. 
The Arab’s world close neighbour Iran began to eliminate fuel subsidies with effect from December 
2010. The country now distributes its oil and natural gas revenues via a universal cash programme, 
illustrating how universal schemes could be an attractive policy solution, particularly for the Arab 
world’s energy producers and exporters (see Box 2 below).122 123 124 125 126 127
122 For a detailed discussion of the Iranian experience so far, see Tabatabai (2011, 1–24); Tabatabai (2012 forthcom-
ing); Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin (2011).
123 Tabatabai (2011,4).
124 Tabatabai (2011, 10–11).
125 Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin (2011, 3)
126 IMF (2011d).
127 IMF (2011d); See also Guillaume, Zytek and Farzin (2011).
BOx 2: tHE IRAnIAn EnERgy SuBSIDy REfORm Of jAnuARy 2010
in January 2010 the iranian government began what was perhaps the most comprehensive energy pricing 
reform seen so far among major energy producing and exporting countries in the middle east. the reform 
came in response to years of rising costs to its budget of fuel and electricity subsidies, in a country with 
among the world’s lowest prices of liquid fuels and natural gas. the total value of subsidies as part of public 
expenditure had reached uS$100 billion by 2010 – some 30% of gDp – 90% of which were energy subsidies. 
the iranian subsidy system has been widely criticized as being highly inequitable, leading to excessive levels 
of energy consumption, environmental pollution, and smuggling to neighbouring countries.123 With the 
reform taking effect in December 2010, iran increased gasoline prices by 400%, natural gas (>700%), diesel 
(1,000%), electricity (<300%), and water prices virtually overnight.
iran’s reform of energy prices was, from the beginning, coupled to an overhaul of the country’s existing 
social security system, and to the introduction of a large-scale compensatory cash transfer programme, 
that would benefit large parts of the population. the original plan of June 2008 had been the elimination of 
energy subsidies, in combination with targeted, direct cash grants to the population, which would contain 
an element of redistribution in favour of low income households. problems with the design of the initially 
means-tested transfer scheme, and parliamentary opposition to initial plans for the pace of the reform pack-
age, led to the revised January 2010 law, which contained a more gradual reform pace and a revised transfer 
scheme. the eventual transfer scheme is universal, includes both adults and children as recipients, and is 
unconditional, requiring only nationality and registration (despite government reference up until now to a 
‘targeted’ cash grant).124
First reactions to the programme from international financial organizations have been overwhelmingly 
positive. by December 2011, subsidies worth an estimated $60 billion dollars (15% of gDp) will have been 
removed from the public budget over a period of a mere 12 months. A figure of $30 billion was thus avail-
able for cash transfers, and a further sum of $10–15 billion has been used to help industry (particularly in 
energy-intensive sectors) to restructure and reduce its energy intensity.125 in a recent statement following a 
visit to iran, the imF concluded that ‘the energy price increases are already leading to a decline in excessive 
domestic energy consumption and related energy waste. While the subsidy reform is expected to result in a 
transitory slowdown in economic growth and temporary increase in the inflation rate, it should considerably 
improve iran’s medium-term outlook by rationalizing domestic energy use, increasing export revenues, 
strengthening overall competitiveness, and bringing economic activity in iran closer to its full potential.’126 
the imF estimated inflation in iran at 10.1% in December 2010, with an increase to 14.2% by may 2011. this 
was less than had been initially expected following and energy price increase of over 20 times in the second 
half of 2010.127
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Reprioritizing Public Expenditure. Governments also have an option to use part of the proceeds 
of pricing reform to invest more actively in specific priority sectors. In many cases, the share of 
government expenditure on fuel subsidies exceeds social spending on pro-poor sectors such as 
health and education; in Egypt, for instance, total government expenditure on energy subsidies in 
2008 equalled the country’s combined expenditure on health and education, as did fuel subsidies in 
Jordan prior to the country’s 2008 reform of fuel prices.128 Yemen’s budgeted expenditure on fuel 
subsidies in 2008 amounted to more than 34 per cent of total government expenditure – more than 
one and a half times its expenditure on education and health combined (see Figure 11).129 Syria’s 
expenditure on fuel subsidies in 2008 as a share of total government expenditure greatly exceeded 
health and education spending (a total of S£66.3 billion). In October 2008, Syrian Minister of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources Sufian ‘Alaw put the figure for Syria’s total fuel subsidies in 
2008 at S£340 billion, more than five times this amount, owing to higher than expected interna-
tional prices. ‘Alaw is cited by MEES, commenting at the time, that by liberalizing the prices of 
fuel oil and diesel oil, the Syrian government could double public sector salaries and still have 
some surplus left.130 
fIguRE 11: SHARE Of gOvERnmEntAl ExpEnDItuRE On fuEl SuBSIDIES, EDuCAtIOn, AnD 
HEAltH In SElECtED ARAB COuntRIES, 2008
128 In 2008 Egypt spent 11.93% of gross annual expenditure on education, 5.94% on health, and an estimated 17.85% 
on fuel subsidies. World Bank (2011); IEA; Subsidy estimates based on IEA and World Bank (2011); 
129 Breisinger et al. (2011).
130 Syria’s 2008 ‘subsidy’ item includes ‘other subsidies’ which are combined in the IMF published revised budget 
numbers for 2008 (a total of S£66.3 billion). In October 2008, Syria’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Re-
sources Sufian ‘Alaw stated that Syria’s total fuel subsidies in 2008 stood instead at S£340 billion, more than five 
times this amount, owing to higher than expected international prices. ‘Alaw is cited by MEES commenting at 
the time that by liberalizing the prices of fuel oil and diesel oil, the Syrian government could double public sector 
salaries and still have some surplus left. MEES (2008); IMF (2010a, 18).
Source: Egypt: World Bank (2011); Yemen: Breisinger et al (2011), Authors’ own calculations; Syria: IMF (2010a), MEES, World Bank (2011); 
Jordan: IMF (2010b), World Bank (2011). 
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One set of priorities could involve a shift of investment from fuel subsidies to other sectors, 
particularly pro-poor sectors including education and health, as well as social protection and, 
where feasible, public sector wages. The expansion of schools and universal health care remains 
a challenge in many parts of the Arab world, but one likely to bring benefits to the economy in 
the long term. Governments can also reprioritize expenditure in areas that generate more business 
and profitability, for instance via funding channelled into industry-oriented programmes aimed at 
increasing productivity and energy efficiency rates, for instance via loan schemes and company 
auditing; tax credits on certain industries; or more direct industry-based subsidies. 
Connection Subsidies. Evidence from individual countries suggests that fuel subsidies can play 
a very limited role in raising access to modern forms of energy such as electricity. The case of 
Yemen illustrates that fuel subsidies may have had the opposite effect. Fuel subsidies which result 
in large losses for national oil companies or local distributors undermine incentives for suppliers or 
distributors to extend energy infrastructure to local populations. In countries that have witnessed 
dramatic improvements in access, it was achieved through public investment in infrastructure 
rather than through the granting of fuel subsidies. One of the main obstacles to accessing modern 
forms of energy such as LPG, natural gas, and electricity is the high initial costs of connecting to 
these sources. Thus, rather than opting for fuel subsidies, there might be a case for energy connec-
tion subsidies, especially in low coverage areas such as in rural Yemen or urban Egypt.
However, the success of such a policy would depend on a number of factors, such as the willing-
ness and ability of distributors to extend the network access to poor households. For instance, in 
Egypt’s case, natural gas distributors have no incentive to provide access to poor areas because poor 
households have a low volume of gas uptake and are reluctant to enter into long-term contracts. In 
Yemen, the cost of grid provision does not favour any extension of access to populations living in 
dispersed settlements, divided by difficult terrain, and with low consumption. Thus, there has been 
an increasing emphasis on off-grid alternatives.131 The effectiveness of connection subsidies also 
depends on whether poor households are willing or able to pay for a connection. In Egypt, poor 
households were not encouraged to take on gas connection, despite the government requiring or 
charging only a fraction of the cost of the connection.132 
Long-term Fuel Price Adjustment 
A potentially important long-term determinant of energy subsidy reform success can be the way 
in which energy prices adapt to market fluctuations on a permanent basis. Once domestic prices 
have been adjusted, regulated markets imply that future fluctuations in international prices will 
reopen a disparity between domestic price levels and shadow price levels. In the absence of fully 
deregulated energy markets, the reform of energy prices without a long-term adjustment mecha-
nism will hence be likely to result in the re-emergence of energy subsidies. Discretionary or ad hoc 
price adjustments may be used by governments to close the gap, but they render price adjustments 
131 See, for instance, a UN ESCWA sponsored electrification project in Yemen: Deghaili, W. (2009).
132 Gerner and Sinclair (2006).
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contingent on governments’ willingness to adjust prices in the first place. With mounting political 
pressure on governments to refrain from further price increases, the reform of subsidies may be 
jeopardized; and potential future price adjustments may result in irregular, sudden, and compara-
bly large price rises contingent on considerable new fiscal pressure.
An alternative can be the introduction of an automated, rules-based price adjustment mecha-
nism for domestically consumed fuels, which updates domestic prices at regular intervals. The 
advantages of automated price adjustments are various: they ensure regular price revisions, and 
thus limit the chance for new build-ups of energy subsidies; by involving regular price revisions, 
automated adjustment mechanisms reduce one-time price rises and also pass through declines in 
international prices; by linking the revision of prices to automatic rules, energy price decisions 
are to a greater extent de-politicized than under discretionary, ad hoc government-induced adjust-
ments. Finally, automated price adjustment mechanisms can help smooth the effect of future fuel 
price volatility on international markets, for instance by basing monthly prices on an average of 
the previous month’s prices on international markets. One downside of automated price adjust-
ment mechanisms is a certain potential for fuel hoarding prior to expected fuel price rises, which 
needs to be addressed separately, for instance by limiting the time between price adjustments.
Communication and Transparency
Effective communication of reforms, together with transparency, can be a critical tool for the 
success of pricing reform. Ensuring that the reform and its potential benefits for the economy 
are widely understood is likely to increase popular acceptance and limit protest and opposition 
(the Jordanian case, discussed in greater detail below, is a case in point). Communicating the 
reform’s rationale and objectives can involve publicizing the rationale for price reforms, including 
the economic, social, and environmental costs of low energy prices and how these are being paid 
for; and the objectives for reform, such as the consolidation of government finances and greater 
availability of funds for other social expenditure. Information about compensatory schemes, such 
as cash transfer programmes or targeted subsidies, should be included in any discussion of the 
reform. A recent IMF review of 40 country experiences between 2002 and 2006 revealed that 
the likelihood of subsidy reforms almost tripled in the presence of strong political support and 
proactive public communications.133
4.3. Case Study: the jordanian Energy price Reform
Starting in 2005, Jordan implemented a relatively successful reform programme which resulted in 
the gradual elimination of energy subsidies over a three year period. This success follows previ-
ously unsuccessful reform efforts in the late 1980s and early 2000, when large-scale demonstra-
tions had forced the Jordanian government to reverse its reform plans.134 Before this programme, 
133 IMF (2011b, 47).
134 Arabian Business (2008). 
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Jordan used to import crude oil, some of which was at concessional prices (from Iraq until 2003 
and Saudi Arabia until 2004), refine it at the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company, and then sell 
the refined products at controlled prices. The losses incurred by the refinery were reimbursed by 
the government directly from its budget, increasing pressures on public finances. Higher import 
prices for crude oil since 2004 led to a rise in the cost of fuel subsidies in the Kingdom that 
became increasingly unsustainable.
In July 2005, the government increased the price of petroleum products as a first step in a three-
stage plan to eliminate subsidies and liberalize the energy sector. The price increases were dra-
matic and saw gasoline prices increase by around 10 per cent, while fuel oil for power and industry 
increased by 33 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. These domestic price increases, however, did 
not prevent the size of energy subsidies from increasing as oil prices in international markets con-
tinued to rise. Consequently, the government decided to raise fuel prices again in 2005 to prevent 
further deterioration in the budget deficit. The second stage of the subsidy plan was put in effect 
in 2006 when the Jordanian government increased energy prices in April of that year. As in the 
first stage, the price increases were dramatic, ranging from 1.3 per cent for jet fuel to 65 per cent 
for fuel oil to  the power sector. In 2007, the government resisted passing the increase in oil prices 
on international markets to the domestic market. This decision was, however, overturned and in 
2008 the government decided to remove most energy subsidies, resulting in large price increases 
which ranged from 16 per cent for gasoline to 76.5 per cent for LPG. To ensure that domestic 
prices are aligned with those in international markets, the government set up a committee in 
2008– comprising members from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Finance 
Ministry, and the Jordan Petroleum Refining Company – to set the price on a monthly basis based 
on a formula which reflects international prices and freight allowance. The implementation of this 
price adjustment mechanism helped reduce the risk of policy reversal.
As a result of these reform efforts, the size of energy subsidies declined from 5.8 per cent of GDP 
in 2005, to 2.6 per cent in 2006, and 0.4 per cent in 2010.135 This helped the government improve 
its public finances, but not without having adverse consequences on households and industry. 
Estimates of the impact of price energy increases on households’ income are substantial. Coady 
et al estimated that energy price increases generate a direct income effect of 2 per cent, and an 
indirect income effect of 2.4 per cent, i.e. a total decline in a household’s income of 4.4 per cent.136 
They also find that the impact on households in low income brackets is likely to be higher than that 
on households in high income brackets.
To mitigate the impact of energy prices rises, the Jordanian government has, more recently, invested 
considerably in measures aimed at protecting poor- and medium-income households. Public sector 
wages and pensions were raised with an average wage increase of between $63 to $70 per month, 
and $150 to $220 for families with a monthly income of $1000 or less. Low income earners in 
the private sector received a separate compensation scheme. An estimated 60 per cent of Jordan’s 
population of some 5.8 million benefited from these wage increases. In addition, Jordan reformed 
135 IMF (2010b); Coady et al.(2006).
136 Coady et al. (2006).
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and expanded its existing social safety networks. The country’s National Aid Fund, the country’s 
main body through which targeted cash transfers are distributed, was stocked up with funding and 
its targeting scheme improved. In addition, lifeline tariff schemes for electricity and an upgraded 
food subsidy programme targeted poor and low income households to offset the negative conse-
quences of energy price rises.137 The initial mitigation programme was estimated to be equivalent 
to 7 per cent of GDP – it was advertised widely to gather acceptance for the subsidy reform. In 
2010, the government further reformed its social system by introducing a new social security law, 
aimed at further improving social protection while lending further credibility to the government’s 
reform efforts. 
The Jordanian fuel subsidy phasing-out is now considered initially successful, ‘in part because 
it was well designed and the public understood that it was needed.’138 However, in January 2011 
Jordan reversed some of its earlier steps towards reform, at least for the time being. Following 
popular protests against rising living costs and unemployment in parallel to the Tunisian upris-
ings, the government approved a US$230 million package to reduce food and fuel prices, and 
temporarily suspended its automated fuel adjustment mechanism in an effort to curb further fuel 
price rises.139
Unlike the case in some other countries, Jordan pursued a separate reform strategy for its elec-
tricity sector. In 1999, Jordan unbundled its power sector and created an independent regulator 
to oversee it. Jordan’s power stations were merged into a newly created company, the Central 
Electricity Generating Company (CEGCO). CEGCO sells its output to the National Electric Power 
Company (NEPCO), which owns the transmission network and is the system operator. It is also 
responsible for procuring the fuel inputs for power generators. NEPCO in turn sells electricity to 
distribution companies at regulated prices, who in turn sell it to end users also at regulated prices. 
Electricity tariffs are often revised by the Electricity Regulatory Commission to ensure that prices 
charged by electric companies are sufficient to recover costs and allow them to earn a reasonable 
return on its investment. 
However, in the last two years, NEPCO has been incurring some serious losses. The interruption of 
gas supplies from Egypt meant that NEPCO had to resort to purchasing oil product fuels at prices 
linked to international prices. On the other hand, it has to sell the resulting power production at 
regulated prices that did not rise in line with increasing fuel costs. In August 2011, the Jordanian 
finance minister announced that NEPCO had incurred losses of $1.128 billion up to that point in 
2011, which have to be financed by the government.140 However, energy subsidies to the electricity 
sector are projected to end by 2012. More generally, the Jordanian case shows the importance of 
revising fuel prices within a broader context of energy pricing reform, and liberalization of the 
entire energy sector including the power sector.
137 World Bank (2010), Subsidies in the Energy Sector: An Overview, 90; ‘Fuel prices skyrocket as Jordan cuts sub-
sidies’, Arabian Business, 9 February 2008
138 World Bank (2010, 90)
139 IMF (2011b, 47); Al Arabiya News (2011). 
140 ‘Jordan’s Subsidies For 2011 Estimated At $2bn’, MEES (2011b). 
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Much of the literature studies energy subsidies from particular perspectives, for instance from 
the environmental perspective (through their contribution to emissions); from a public health 
perspective (through their impact on access to cleaner cooking fuels); or from an energy security 
perspective (with lessened energy subsidies making more oil available to the market, which will 
reduce its price). This paper provides an analysis of energy subsidies as an economic and social 
policy issue. It emphasizes the need to study energy subsidies more in terms of their contributions 
and unintended consequences on social and economic development goals. This paper also focuses 
on one of the world’s most diverse regions in terms of energy resource endowment and levels of 
economic development – the Arab world which includes energy net importers as well as major 
energy-exporting economies. 
Energy subsidies in the Arab world are characterized by a wide variation in terms of socio-eco-
nomic policy objectives, and in terms of government approaches towards financing them. Poverty 
alleviation and the protection of households’ incomes remains one of the most fundamental goals 
behind energy subsidies, having particular relevance for Arab states which are importers of energy 
and which also experience relatively high levels of poverty. In the absence of alternative welfare 
systems, energy subsidies often remain de facto an important social safety net, helping to increase 
access to energy as well as contributing to lower prices for other goods in the economy. For 
many of the Arab energy producers, on the other hand, the provision of low-cost energy remains 
a critical tool to diversify their economies and to distribute wealth, much of which is generated 
from oil and natural gas exports. Many of these countries would not consider their energy prices 
subsidized, arguing their domestic prices reflect in most cases the cost advantage of producing 
different fuels domestically. 
Irrespective of questions of definition, low energy prices have resulted in real economic costs, both 
in energy importing and exporting countries. These include an inefficient allocation of resources; 
exceptionally low levels of energy efficiency; high and rapidly rising levels of fuel and electricity 
consumption both in absolute and per capita terms; and in some cases decade-long underinvest-
ment in domestic energy sectors. In terms of their impact on poverty alleviation, a high share of 
energy subsidies has been shown to be captured by higher income groups and industries. While 
energy subsidies do hence benefit low income households, they must be seen as a costly and 
inefficient tool to protect the poor in the Arab world. The financial resources committed to energy 
subsidies are funds which could have been spent on other pro-poor expenditure items such as 
education and health services, or targeted social security programmes.
5.  Conclusions
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Nevertheless, the reform of domestic energy pricing frameworks remains an economically and 
politically challenging task. The social and economic costs of unmitigated subsidy reforms can be 
large, not last in view of making poverty levels more severe, and lessening social protection for the 
poorest parts of society. Politically, rising energy prices, alongside increased prices for food and 
other essential goods, are sensitive and can provoke large-scale protests. The most recent wave of 
political uprisings in different parts of the Arab world has already impacted the pace and direction 
of some of the tentative price reforms that have taken place in the region in the past few years. 
Both Jordan and Lebanon revised their energy prices downward in the response to popular pres-
sure in the first half of 2011, contrary to both countries’ original plans. Syria, at the time of writing, 
is engaged in political domestic conflict, with its original plans to further the country’s pricing 
reform seemingly abandoned for the time being. In Egypt, the November 2011 parliamentary 
elections have, at the time of writing, not resulted in political stability, raising questions over the 
relevance of revising energy pricing policy as an immediate policy priority. 
It is most probable that the political climate resulting from the 2011 Arab uprisings will increase the 
political adversity facing many Arab governments pursuing painful economic reforms, including 
the reform of domestic energy prices. This expectation has perhaps been expressed most clearly 
in a recent, unusually emphatic statement by Moroccan authorities in a recent IMF consultation 
paper, that ‘subsidy reform will be politically difficult.’141 Consequently, making policy recom-
mendations becomes an increasingly difficult task in the context of the current political turmoil 
in the region. 
Even so, some limited reform success in parts of the region in recent years shows that the reform 
of energy subsidies can be feasible in the Arab world. Countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
and Tunisia raised energy prices in response to the 2008 oil price hike, with Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Tunisia cementing the reform, at least temporarily, into automated price adjustment mechanisms. 
Both Jordan and Syria combined their price revisions with the reform of their social security sys-
tems to compensate for, and partially replace, benefits previously distributed in energy subsidies. 
Perhaps as an important precedent for the region’s energy exporters Iran, the Arab world’s close 
neighbour, recently reformed its own domestic pricing regime to an extent unseen so far in the 
region. This reform, which couples reductions in fuel and electricity subsidies to the distribution 
of universal cash transfers, has so far been received largely positively, both domestically and by 
international institutions; and it suggests that the reform of subsidies coupled to effective com-
pensatory schemes can proceed with little political protest, and with manageable macroeconomic 
consequences.
141 IMF (2011a, 9).
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